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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This case arises from decisions of the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor

to Johnny Albert's claims for medical and permanent partial disability benefits
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act (Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code
/
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the Commission's Rule 602-2-LD.
In seeking this Court's review of the Appeals Board's decisions, Barnard &
Burk
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Procedures Act (Title 63, Chapter 46b, Utah Code Annotated: "IJAP A" hereafter).
Barnard & Burk also contends the Appeals Board misapplied Rule 602-2-1 .D and
violated other j rincipl t s • : f I Itah lie

I 'inalb - Bai nai cl & Eli irl ;:

~ .

regardless of the Appeals Board's application of Rule 602-2-l.D, the Board's
decision is inadequate to support an award of medical benefits to Mi Albert...
The Commission believes the issi les raised by Barnai d & Bi irk are logically
considered in the following order:
^
602-
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to the pleading requirements set out in §63-46b-6(l) of UAPA.
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Standard of review:

Whether Rule 602-2-l.D violates §63-46b-6(l) of

UAPA is a question of general law to be reviewed under a "correction of error"
standard. Pursuant to § 63-46b-16(4)(d) of UAPA, this Court may grant relief if
the Appeals Board has erroneously interpreted §63-46b-6(l).
Industrial Commission, 942 P. 2d 961, 963 (Utah App. 1997);

Harrington v.

Maverik Country

Stores. Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 944, 949 (Utah App. 1993).
Preservation for review: The Commission believes Barnard & Burk did
not preserve this issue for review. Please refer to the Commission's discussion of
this issue at Point II, Part A, of this brief.
2. Did the Appeals Board properly interpret and apply Rule 602-2l.D?

Barnard & Burk argues that the Appeals Board either a) erroneously

interpreted Rule 602-2-l.D, or b) applied the rule in an arbitrary and capricious
manner.
Standard of review: Pursuant to §63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) of UAPA, the Court
will uphold the Board's interpretation of Rule 602-2-l.D unless the interpretation
exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. Brown & Root v. Industrial
Commission, 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997). Likewise, pursuant to §63-46b16(4)(h)(iv) of UAPA, the Court will apply a "reasonableness and rationality"
standard in evaluating whether the Board's application of the rule was arbitrary
and capricious. R.O.A. Gen. Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 966 P.2d 840,
842 (Utah 1998).

~T

Preservation for review: Bamard & Burk raised this issue in proceedings
before the Appeals Board, thereby preserving the issue for judicial review. (R.
705-709.)
3. Is the Appeals Board's application of Rule 602-2-l.D contrary to
other provisions of Utah law? Bamard & Burk argues that the Appeals Board's
application of Rule 602-2-l.D is contrary to appellate precedent and other general
law.
Standard of review: Whether the Appeals Board properly interpreted and
applied appellate precedent, rules of civil procedure and nonagency specific
legislation are questions of general law. Pursuant to §63-46b-16(4)(d) of UAPA,
the Court will apply a correction of error standard to such questions. Harrington v.
Industrial Commission, 942 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah App. 1997).
Preservation for review: Barnard & Burk raised this issue in proceedings
before the Appeals Board, thereby preserving the issue for judicial review. (R.
705-709.)
4. Is the Appeals Board's decision sufficient as to Barnard & Burke's
liability for Mr. Albert's medical expenses? Bamard & Burk contends the
Board's findings of fact do not support the Board's conclusion that Bamard &
Burk is liable for Mr. Albert's medical expenses arising from his accident at
Bamard & Burk.

~3~

Standard of review: Whether the Board's findings are adequate is a legal
determination that is made with no deference to the Appeals Board. Adams v.
Board of Review. 821 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1991).
Preservation for review: Barnard & Burk raised this issue in proceedings
before the Appeals Board, thereby preserving the issue for judicial review. (R.
vol. 3, pp. 540,541)
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following determinative statutes and rules are included in Appendix A.
•

Labor Commission Rule 602-2-1 JD, Utah Administrative Code.

•

Section 34A-2-417(l) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.

•

Section 63-46b-6 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: Barnard & Burk seeks review of the Appeals Board's
decisions (Appendix B and Appendix C) affirming Administrative Law Judge La
Jeunesse's determination (Appendix D) that Barnard & Burk must pay medical
expenses and permanent partial disability compensation for injuries Mr. Albert
suffered while employed by Barnard & Burk during 1991.
Course of Proceedings/Statement of Facts:1 Beginning in 1990, while
Mr. Albert was working for Quality Plating, and then continuing over the next

1 Barnard & Burk does not challenge the Board's determination of the underlying facts
regarding Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits. Instead, Barnard &
Burk appeal focuses on procedural issues. For that reason, this brief combines the course
of proceedings with such facts as are relevant to the issues in dispute.
'4

seven years through subsequent employment with Barnard & Burk, American
Asbestos, and Ameritemps, Mr. Albert suffered a series of work-related injuries.
(Appendix D, R. 697.) On October 2, 2001, he filed Applications For Hearing
with the Commission to compel each of the foregoing employers, including
Barnard & Burk, to pay medical expenses, temporary total disability compensation
and permanent partial disability compensation for his injuries. (R. 228-235.)
After receiving Mr. Albert's Applications For Hearing, the Commission
sent a Request For Answer to each employer and its workers' compensation
insurance carrier. The Request For Answer directed each employer/insurance
carrier to file an Answer to Mr. Albert's Application. The Request For Answer
specifically advised each employer/insurance carrier that "(f)ailure to set forth
any affirmative defense(s) may preclude your raising such defense(s) at the
hearing." (R. 262; emphasis added.)
Mr. Albert's various claims were consolidated for a single hearing. (R.
270.) Mr. Albert then filed four amended Applications For Hearing adding a
claim for permanent total disability compensation against the original respondents.
(R. 272-279.) Mr. Albert also filed a new Application For Hearing against a fifth
employer, Trans West Construction. (R. 272.)
As one of the respondents to Mr. Albert's claims, Barnard & Burk filed its
Answer on June 28, 2002. (R. 348-364.) Barnard & Burk's Answer included a
"Seventh Defense" that stated: "Defendants affirmatively allege the applicant's
claims are or may be barred or limited by the statutes of limitation and/or notice
~5~

provisions contained in Utah Code Annotated §34A-2 et seq., §34A-3 et seq. and
§35-1 et seq." R.351.)
Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse held a formal evidentiary hearing
on Mr. Albert's claims on December 17, 2002. (R. vol. 9.) Barnard & Burk
participated through counsel. (R. vol. 9, p. 5.) Even though Barnard & Burk
participated in opening arguments, Mr. Albert's cross-examination, and closing
arguments, Barnard & Burk make no reference to any affirmative defenses. (R.
vol. 9, p. 23-26; 85-94; 134-135; 145-147.)
Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence submitted at the
hearing, Judge La Jeunesse made the following findings of fact regarding Mr.
Albert's claim against Barnard & Burk.
•

Mr. Albert was employed by Barnard & Burk on January 21, 1991.

(Appendix D; R. 500.) 2) On that day, while removing asbestos at an oil
refinery on behalf of Barnard & Burk, Mr. Albert slipped, fell, and landed
on his back on a pipe. He immediately sought medical care (Appendix D;
R. 506.)
•

Dr. Dall diagnosed Mr. Albert with chronic low back pain, half of which

was caused by his work accident at Barnard & Burk. Dr. Dall concluded
that Mr. Albert had suffered a permanent 214% whole person impairment as
a result of this incident. (Appendix D; R. 507.)
Based on these facts, Judge La Jeunesse awarded permanent partial
disability compensation to Mr. Albert for his chronic low back impairment. Judge
6~

La Jeunesse also ordered Barnard & Burk to pay "all medical expenses reasonably
related to Johnny Albert's industrial accident of January 21, 1991." (Appendix D;
R. 526.)
On August 21, 2003, Barnard & Burk appealed Judge La Jeunesse's
decision to the Appeals Board. (R. 540-541.) Barnard & Burk alleged that Mr.
Albert's right to medical expenses was cut off by operation of § 417(1) of the Act
because Mr. Albert had not, for a period of three consecutive years, incurred and
submitted any medical expenses related to his accident at Barnard & Burk.
Barnard & Burk also alleged that Judge La Jeunesse erred in ordering Barnard &
Burk to pay medical expenses related to Mr. Albert's accident at Barnard & Burke
on the grounds there was no evidence that any medical treatment would be
necessary.

With respect to Judge La Jeunesse's award of permanent partial

disability compensation to Mr. Albert, Barnard & Burk argued the award was
barred by § 417(2) of the Act because Mr. Albert had not filed his Application For
Hearing against Barnard & Burk within six years after the date of his accident.
In his reply to Barnard & Burk's appeal, Mr. Albert argued that Barnard &
Burk had failed to comply with the Commission's Rule 602-2-l.D and Rule 9(h),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore had waived its affirmative defenses
under §417(1) and (2). (R. 546-551.)
In turn, on October 16, 2003, Barnard & Burk replied to Mr. Albert's
response. Barnard & Burk argued that it had satisfied the requirements of Rule
9(h) and the Commission's Rule 602-2-l.D in raising its affirmative defenses.
-

r

However, Barnard & Burk did not allege that the Commission's Rule 602-2-LD
was contrary to §63-46b-6(l) of UAPA. (R. 691-694)
The Appeals Board issued its decision in this matter on May 2, 2004.
Relying on Rule 602-2- LD, the Board concluded that Barnard & Burk had failed
to properly raise its affirmative defenses under §417 and had therefore waived
those defenses. The Board also rejected Barnard & Burk's challenge to Judge La
Jeunesse's determination that Barnard & Burk was liable for Mr. Albert's medical
expenses related to his injury at Barnard & Burk. (Appendix B; R. 699, 700.)
Barnard & Burk then asked the Appeals Board to reconsider its decision.
Barnard & Burk reiterated its previous arguments but then added, for the first
time, the additional argument that it had no obligation to raise its §417(1) defense
to Mr. Albert's claim for medical expenses until after Mr. Albert's claim for
permanent total disability compensation had been denied. (R. 705-709.)
On October 18, 2004, the Appeals Board denied Barnard & Burk's request
for reconsideration. (Appendix C; R. 848-850.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Legislature has authorized and directed the Labor Commission to
promulgate rules governing workers' compensation adjudicative proceedings.

The

Commission has promulgated Rule 602-2-l.D pursuant to that rule-making authority.
Rule 602-2-l.D simply requires that respondents, such as Barnard & Burk "shall state all
affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully
informed of the nature of the defense asserted

~8

In this case, Barnard and Burk filed an Answer to Mr. Albert's claim for benefits
that purported to raise affirmative defenses to the claim, but did so with no accuracy or
detail The Appeals Board properly concluded that Barnard & Burk had failed to satisfy
the requirements of Rule 602-2-l.D and, therefore, had waived its affirmative defenses.
Regarding Mr. Albert's right to medical treatment for the injuries suffered while
working at Barnard & Burk, the undisputed facts support the Appeals Board's conclusion
that he is entitled to such treatment, and Barnard & Burk has suffered no prejudice from
the Board's determination.
In addressing the issues presented by Mr. Albert's claim against Barnard & Burk,
the Appeals Board's decisions have been consistent with applicable law and regulation.
The Board's decisions are also consistent with the underlying principle that the workers'
compensation law should be applied liberally in favor of compensation.

For these

reasons, the Appeals Board's decisions should be upheld.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: RULE 602-2-13 IS NOT CONTRARY TO UAPA,

A. Barnard & Burk Did Not Preserve This Issue For Judicial Review,
Section 63-46b-14(2) of UAPA provides: "A party may seek judicial review only
after exhausting all administrative remedies available . . . ."

The Utah Supreme

Court "has consistently held that issues not raised in proceedings before
administrative agencies are not subject to judicial review except in exceptional

2 Section 63-46b-14(2) sets forth two exceptions to its general rule requiring exhaustion.
However, neither exception is applicable to the circumstances of this case.
-

r

circumstances." Brown & Root v. Industrial Commission, 947 P.2d 671, 677
(Utah 1997).
The following discussion of the record in this case shows that Barnard &
Burk never presented its argument that Rule 602-2-l.D is contrary to UAPA to the
Appeals Board. Consequently, that issue is not subject to judicial review.
After Judge La Jeunesse ordered Barnard & Burk to pay medical expenses
and permanent partial disability compensation caused by Mr. Albert's work injury,
Barnard & Burk appealed to the Appeals Board. (R. 540, 541.) It was in this
appeal, for the first time, that Barnard & Burk stated that it was relying on §417(1)
and (2) as affirmative defenses to Mr. Albert's claim. Mr. Albert then responded
to Barnard & Burk's appeal by arguing that Barnard & Burk had waived its §417
defenses because it had failed to raise the defenses at the time and in the manner
required by Rule 602-2-l.D. (R. 548,549.)
In light of Mr. Albert's response to Barnard & Burk's appeal, the
applicability of Rule 602-2-l.D to Barnard & Burk's affirmative defenses was
squarely before the Appeals Board.

However, even though Barnard & Burk

submitted a reply memorandum to Mr. Albert's argument (R. 691-694), Barnard &
Burk did not suggest that Rule 602-2-1JD violated UAPA.
The Appeals Board ruled that Barnard & Burk had waived its §417
defenses by failing to comply with Rule 602-2-l.D. (Appendix B; R. 696-703.)
Barnard & Burk asked the Board to reconsider its decision (R. 696-701.)

But

even at this point, after the Board had specifically relied on Rule 602-2-l.D to
~10~

reject Barnard & Burk's §417 defenses, Barnard & Burk still did not argue that
Rule 602-2-l.D violated UAPA.

The argument was never raised before the

Commission or Appeals Board.
In view of UAPA's requirement that a party seeking judicial review must
first exhaust all administrative remedies and appellate precedent that issues not
raised before administrative agencies are not subject to judicial review, the
Commission submits that this Court should decline to consider Barnard & Burk's
newly raised assertion that Rule 602-2-l.D is contrary to UAPA.
B.

The Utah Legislature has granted broad authority to the

Commission to promulgate rules such as 602-2-l.D.
Section 34A-1-304(1) of the Labor Commission Act (Title 34A, Chapter 1,
Utah Code Annotated) provides that the Commission "shall make rules governing
adjudicative procedures" and, except as required by Title 34A and UAPA, such
rules "are not required to conform to common law or statutory rules of evidence or
other technical rules of procedure."
The Commission's rule-making authority is further underscored by §34A2-802(1) of the Workers5 Compensation Act:
The commission, the commissioner, an administrative law
judge, or the Appeals Board, is not bound by the usual common law
or statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal rules or
procedure, other than as provided in this section or as adopted by the
commission pursuant to this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act. The commission may make its
investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to
ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly
the spirit of the chapter.

11

In light of this legislative grant of rule-making authority, the Commission
unquestionably had authority to promulgate Rule 602-2-1JD.
C. Rule 602-2-LD Is Not Contrary To UAPA. Barnard & Burke argue
that the Commission's Rule 602-2-LD is contrary to §63-46b-6(l) of UAPA.
However, Barnard & Burk misreads §63-46b-6(l). For example, at page 31 of its
brief, Barnard & Burk makes the following statement (emphasis added):
The Legislature has directed by statute [here referring to §6346b-6(l)] that a responsive pleading . . . must include only the
following: 1) the agency's file number . . . , (2) the name of the
adjudicative proceeding, (3) a statement of the relief that the
respondent seeks, (4) a statement of the facts, and (5) a statement
summarizing the reasons that the relief requested should be granted.
While §63-46b-6(l) identifies elements that must be included in responsive
pleadings, the statute does not prohibit an administrative agency from requiring
other elements. Subsection (3) of §63-46b-6 recognizes that "the agency by rule,
may permit or require pleadings in addition to the . . . response." Likewise, §6346b-1(6) provides that UAPA "does not preclude an agency from enacting a rule
affecting or governing an adjudicative proceeding . . . if the rule conforms to the
requirements of this Chapter."
Thus, UAPA itself recognizes the propriety of agency rules, such as Rule
602-2-LD, that refine and amplify §63-46b-6(l)'s minimum standards for
responsive pleadings.
Summary.

The Commission submits that Barnard & Burk failed to

preserve its argument that Rule 602-2-LD violates UAPA. As to the merits of that

~12

argument, the Commission acted within clear statutory authority in promulgating
Rule 602-2- I D . Nothing in UAPA prohibits such rule making; to the contrary,
UAPA specifically anticipates that agencies will enact such rules. The Court
should therefore reject Barnard & Burk's argument that Rule 602-2-ID is
contrary to UAPA.
POINT II: THE APPEALS BOARD PROPERLY APPLIED
RULE 602-2-l.D IN THIS CASE.
Rule 602-2-l.D simply requires respondents in workers' compensation
proceedings to files answers that "state all affirmative defenses with sufficient
accuracy and detail that an applicant may be folly informed of the nature of the
defense asserted." The Appeals Board's application of this rule will be upheld if it
is within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.

Brown & Root v.

Industrial Commission, 947 P.2d 677.
The reasonableness and rationality of the Board's decisions are plain from
the decisions themselves. (See Appendix B and Appendix C.) The Board
acknowledged that §417 established affirmative defenses to claims for ongoing
medical care and for permanent partial disability compensation, but noted that
affirmative defenses are waived if not properly raised. The Board then referred to
the plain requirement of Rule R602-2-1D which requires respondents to include
any affirmative defenses in their answers.
In considering whether Barnard & Burk had discharged its obligation under
Rule 602-2-l.D to properly raise its affirmative defenses, the Board contrasted the

13

clarity with which another respondent (Quality) had pled its §417 defenses with
the vagueness of Barnard & Burk's answer. The Board then explained the purpose
behind Rule 602-2-l.D:
It bears repeating that the purpose behind Rule R602-2-1.D is
to require parties relying on affirmative defenses to provide
reasonable advance notice of those defenses so that the parties who
must respond to those defenses have time to investigate the facts and
present their evidence. Barnard's answer was too vague to meet
either the spirit or the letter of the rule and, therefore, failed to
preserve the § 417 defenses that would otherwise have been
available to Barnard.
Finally, the Board rejected Barnard & Burk's argument that it had
preserved its affirmative defenses by presenting evidence relevant to the defenses
during the course of the evidentiary hearing.
"When reviewing the Commission's application of its own rules, this court
will not disturb the agency's interpretation or application of one of the agency's
rules unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality." Brown & Root v. Industrial Commission, Ibid. The Appeals Board's
decisions meet this test of reasonableness and rationality.
Barnard & Burk argues that Mr. Albert was reasonably apprised of the
nature of Barnard & Burk's affirmative defenses by the 'Tacts and circumstances
surrounding" its Answer. Barnard & Burk also contends that its failure to properly
raise its affirmative defenses was somehow cured when another respondent,
Quality, raised the same defenses in its own behalf. However, these arguments
overlook the principle that affirmative defenses not raised are waived. Pratt v.

~14

Board of Education. 564 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977). In order to preserve its
affirmative defenses, Barnard & Burk was itself required to raise them in the
manner specified by Rule 602-2-l.D.
Barnard & Burk also suggests that the Appeals Board's decisions are
contrary to liberal pleading standards the Labor Commission and Appeals Board
have applied in other cases.

(Petitioner's brief, p. 41)

However, a plain

distinction exists between Barnard & Burk's examples of "liberal pleading
standards" in other Labor Commission proceedings and the circumstances of this
proceeding. The examples of liberal pleading standards referenced by Barnard &
Burk did not involve affirmative defenses or the application of Rule 602-2-l.D.
The actions taken by the Board in these other proceedings are, therefore, not
comparable or relevant to the Board's action in this case.
In conclusion, the Board correctly applied the plain language of Rule 6022-l.D to the facts of this case. The Board's decision was reasonable, rational, and
did not depart from prior agency applications of Rule 602-2-l.D. The Board's
decision should therefore be upheld.
POINT III: THE APPEALS BOARD'S APPLICATION OF RULE
602-2-l.D IS NOT CONTRARY TO OTHER PROVISIONS OF
UTAH LAW
Barnard & Burk contends that Appeals Board "erroneously interpreted and
longstanding,

well-established

Utah law mandating

liberal

interpretation of

administrative pleadings." (Petitioner's brief, p. 22.) The obvious shortcoming of this
argument is that this proceeding is controlled by Rule 602-2-l.D. As discussed in Part I
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of this brief, the Commission has promulgated that rule pursuant to clear legislative
authority and directive. As discussed in Part II of this brief, the Appeals Board has
properly applied the rule to the facts of this case. Consequently, Barnard & Burk's
reliance on general statements of law from other forums is of little relevance.
Apart from its argument that Rule 602-2-1.D is contrary to §63-46b-6(l) of
UAPA, which argument has been addressed in Point I of this brief, Barnard & Burk has
not identified any law or precedent with controlling effect that supercedes the application
of Rule 602-2-1.D.
POINT IV: THE APPEALS BOARD'S DECISION IS SUFFICIENT
AS TO BARNARD & BURKE'S LIABILILTY FOR MR. ALBERT'S
MEDICAL EXPENSES.
As its final challenge to the Appeals Board's decisions, Barnard & Burk argues
that the Appeals Board's Order directing Barnard & Burk to "pay all medical expenses
reasonably related to Johnny Albert's industrial accident of January 21, 1991" is not
supported by the Order's findings of fact.
Section 34A-2-401(l) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides that any
employee injured "by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's
employment. . . shall be paid . . . medical, nurse and hospital services (and) medicines . .
. ." Section 34A-2-418(l) of the Act further defines the employer/insurance carrier's
responsibility to provide medical care for injured workers.

"In addition to the

compensation provided in this chapter . . . the employer or the insurance carrier shall pay
reasonable sums for medical, nurse, and hospital services, for medicines, and for artifical
means, appliances and prostheses necessary to treat the injured employee." Subject only
to defense provided by §417(1), discussed above, this obligation of employers and
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insurance carriers to pay medical expenses continues indefinitely. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty v. Industrial Commission, 657 P. 2d 764 (Utah 1983).
Judge La Jeunesse's findings of fact (Appendix D), adopted by the Appeals Board
(Appendix B), include findings that while Mr. Albert was employed by Barnard & Burk,
he was injured in an accident that arose out of and in the course of his employment.
Judge La Jeunesse also found that Mr. Albert suffered chronic low back pain from his
injury resulting in a 2Vi% permanent impairment. None of these findings are contested.
From the foregoing facts, Judge La Jeunesse concluded that Barnard & Burk is
liable under the Act to pay medical expenses reasonably related to Johnny Albert's
industrial accident of January 21, 1991. However, Judge La Jeunesse did not order
Barnard & Burk to pay any current medical expense. The effect of Judge La Jeunesse's
decision is merely to establish Barnard & Burk's underlying responsibililty for such
medical expenses.
Although Barnard & Burk argues that the findings of fact in this matter do nor
support Judge La Jeunesse's order regarding liability for medical expenses, the foregoing
discussion demonstrates the contrary. Furthermore, pursuant to §63-46b-16(4) of UAPA,
"the appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced . . . ."
Barnard & Burk cannot demonstrate any "substantial prejudice" as a result of the Appeals
Board's determination of its liability for medical expenses.

~17

POINT V: THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS CONSTRUED IN
FAVOR OF COMPENSATION
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act must be liberally construed in favor of
coverage and compensation. In Park Utah Consol. Mines v. Industrial Commission, 84
Utah 841, 36 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah 1934), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
If there is any doubt "respecting the right to compensation, such doubt
should be resolved in favor of the employee or of his dependents as the
case may be." (Citing Chandler v. Industrial Commission, supra.)
Likewise, in Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah 1990), the
Court stated:
It is the duty of the courts and the commission to construe the Workers'
Compensation Act liberally and in favor of employee coverage when
statutory terms reasonably admit of such a construction.
More recently, both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have reaffirmed the
continued vitality of the principle of liberal construction: See Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre
Inv. Co, 956 P.2d at 260 (Utah 1998); see also Burgess v. Siaperas Sand & Gravel 965
P.2d 583, 588 (Utah App. 1998).
The Commission recognizes that this principle of liberal construction does not
mean that compensation should be allowed in every claim.

Walls v. Industrial

Commission, 857 P.2d 964, (Utah App. 1993). However, in cases such as this, where
there is no dispute than an employee has suffered work-related injuries and the Appeals
Board has reasonably determined that the employer has waived its affirmative defenses to
the employee's claim for benefits; the principle of liberal construction supports the
Appeals Board's award of benefits.

w
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Utah Labor Commission respectfully requests
that Barnard & Burk's Petition For Review be denied and that the decisions of the
Appeals Board be affirmed.
Dated this CMU day of April, 2005.

AW-Vk-la

Alan Hennebold
General Counsel
Utah Labor Commission
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Appendix A

R602 . Labor Commission, Adjudication.
R602-2. Adjudication of Workers1 Compensation and Occupational
Disease Claims.
R602-2-1. Pleadings and Discovery.
A. For the purposes of this rule, "Commission" means the
Labor Commission. "Division" means the Division of Adjudication
within the Labor Commission. Adjudicative proceedings for
workers1 compensation and occupational disease claims may be
commenced by the injured worker or dependent filing a request for
agency action with the Commission. The Administrative Law Judge
is afforded discretion in allowing intervention of other parties
pursuant to Section 63-46b-9. The Application for Hearing is the
request for agency action. All such applications shall include
supporting medical documentation of the claim where there is a
dispute over medical issues. Applications without supporting
documentation will not be mailed to the employer or insurance
carrier for answer until the appropriate documents have been
provided.
B. Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is denied by
an employer or insurance carrier, the burden rests on the
applicant to initiate the action by filing an Application for
Hearing with the Commission.
C. When an Application for Hearing is filed with the
Commission, the Commission shall forthwith mail a copy to the
employer or to the employer's insurance carrier.
D. The employer or insurance carrier shall have 30 days
following the date of the mailing of the application to file a
written answer with the Commission, admitting or denying liability
for the claim. The answer shall state all affirmative defenses
with sufficient accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully
informed of the nature of the defense asserted. All answers shall
include a summary and categorization of benefits paid to date on
the claim. A copy shall be sent to the applicant or, if there is
one, to the applicant's attorney by the defendant.
E. When an employer or insurance carrier fails to file an
answer within the 30 days provided above, the Commission may enter
a default against such employer or insurance carrier. The
Commission may then set the matter for hearing, take evidence
bearing on the claim, and enter an Order based on the evidence
presented. Such defaults may be set aside by following the
procedure outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Said
default shall apply to the defendant employer or insurance carrier
and may not be construed to deprive the Employersf Reinsurance
Fund or the Uninsured Employers1 Fund of any appropriate defenses.
F. When the answer denies liability solely on the medical
aspects of the case, the applicant, through his/her attorney or
agent, and the employer or insurance carrier, with the approval of
the Commission or its representative, may enter into a stipulated
set of facts, which stipulation, together with the medical
documents bearing on the case in the Commission's file, may be
used in making the final determination of liability.
G. When deemed appropriate, the Commission or its
representatives may have a pre-hearing or post-hearing conference.
H. Upon filing of the Answer, the defendant may commence

discovery with appropriate sets of interrogatories. Such
discovery should focus on the accident event, witnesses, as well
as past and present medical care. The defendant shall also be
entitled to appropriately signed medical releases to allow
gathering of pertinent medical records. The defendant may also
require the applicant to submit to a medical examination by a
physician of the defendant's choice. Failure of an applicant to
comply with such requests may result in the dismissal of a claim
or a delay in the scheduling of a hearing.
I. Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all discovery
proceedings and shall be signed, unless good cause is shown for a
shorter period, at least one week prior to any scheduled hearing.
J. All medical records shall be filed by the employer or its
insurance carrier as a single joint exhibit at least one week
before the scheduled hearing. Claimant must cooperate and submit
all pertinent medical records contained in his/her file to the
employer or its insurance carrier for the joint exhibit submission
two weeks in advance of a scheduled hearing. Exhibits are to be
placed in an indexed binder arranged by care provider in
chronological order. Exhibits shall include all relevant treatment
records which tend to prove or disprove a fact in issue. Pages
shall be numbered consecutively. Hospital nurses1 notes,
duplicate materials, and other non-relevant materials may not be
included.
K. The Administrative Law Judge shall be notified one week
in advance of any proceeding when it is anticipated that more than
four witnesses will be called, or where it is anticipated that the
hearing of the evidence will require more than two hours.
L. Decisions of the presiding officer in any adjudicative
proceeding shall be issued in accordance with the provisions of
Section 63-46b-5 or 63-46b-10.
M. Any party to an adjudicative proceeding may obtain review
of an Order issued by an Administrative Law Judge by filing a
written request for review with the Adjudication Division in
accordance with the provisions of Section 63-4 6b-12 and Section
34A-1-303. Unless a request for review is properly filed, the
Administrative Law Judge's Order is the final order of the
Commission. If a request for review is filed, other parties to
the adjudicative proceeding may file a response within 20 calendar
days of the date the request for review was filed. Thereafter,
the Administrative Law Judge shall:
1. Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order after
holding such further hearing and receiving such further evidence
as may be deemed necessary,
2. Amend or modify the prior Order by a Supplemental order,
or
3. Refer the entire case for review under Section 34A-2-801.
If the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supplemental Order,
as provided in this subsection, it shall be final unless a request
for review of the same is filed.
N. In formal adjudicative proceedings, the Division shall
generally follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding
discovery and the issuance of subpoenas, except as the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure are modified by the express provisions of

Section 34A-2-802, or as may be otherwise modified by the
presiding officer.
0. A request for reconsideration of an Order on Motion for
Review may be allowed and shall be governed by the provisions of
Section 63-46b-13. Any petition for judicial review of final
agency action shall be governed by the provisions of Section 6346b-14.
KEY: workers' compensation, administrative procedure, hearings,
settlement
January 15, 2002
Notice of Continuation September 5, 2002
34A-1-301 et seq.
63-46b-l et seq.
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(12) <a) Subject to appellate review under Section 34A-1-303, the commission has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine whether the treatment or services rendered to an employee by a physician are:
(i) reasonably related to industrial injuries or occupational diseases; and
(ii) compensable pursuant to this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act.
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (12)(a), Subsection 34A-2-21K7),
or Section 34A-2-212, a person may not maintain a cause of action in any
forum within this state other than the commission for collection or
payment of a physician's billing for treatment or services that are
compensable under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease
Act.
History: C. 1953, 35-1-97, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 69, § 5; 1994, ch. 224, § 11; 1995,
ch. 308, § 1; renumbered by L. 1996, ch.
240, § 150; 1997, ch, 205, § 1; renumbered
by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 115; 2003, ch. 67, § 1;
2004, ch. 113, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, added the definition of ^physician" (Subsection (1)); added Subsection (3)(b)(ii); in Subsection (5)(d),
substituted the reference to a report "in accordance with Subsection (9)" for "the Physician's

Initial Report of Work Injury or Occupational
Disease"; rewrote Subsection (8); substituted
"physician" for "physician, surgeon, or other
health provider" in several places; and made
designation changes and other stylistic changes
throughout the section.
The 2004 amendment, effective May 3, 2004,
added Subsections (2)(c) and (9)(a)(ii) and made
stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — When limitations period begins to
run as to claim for disability benefits for contracting of disease under workers' compensa-

tion or occupational diseases act, 86 A.L.R.5th
295.

34A-2-413. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments — Rehabilitation*
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Final order
Review of plan.
Final order.
Because an order to initiate temporary subsistence payments was based on the initial
finding, it was not a "final order" from which an
abstract could have been issued. While §§ 34A1^303 and 34A-2-801 set forth a broad definition of what constitutes a final order, § 34A-2413 excepts an initial finding of permanent

total disability from the broad definition of
"final order" by expressly stating that the initial, tentative finding is not final. Thomas v.
Color Country Mgmt., 2004 UT 12, 492 Utah
Adv. Rep. 9, 84 P.3d 1201.
Review of plan.
In requiring a "review" of an employer^ reemployment plan (see Subsection (6)(a)(iii)),
the Legislature intended an independent evaluation and approval of the plan. Color Country
Mgmt. v. Labor Comm'n, 2001 UT App 370, 38
P3d 969, cert, denied, 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002)

34A-2-417. Claims and benefits — Time limits for filing —
Burden of proof.
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disability cases an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if for a period of
three consecutive years the employee does not:
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(a) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident; and
(b) submit the medical expenses incurred to the employee's employer or
insurance carrier for payment.
(2) (a) A claim described in Subsection (2)(b) is barred, unless the employee:
(i) files an application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication
no later t h a n six years from the date of t h e accident; and
(ii) by no later t h a n 12 years from the date of the accident, is able
to meet t h e employee's burden of proving t h a t the employee is due the
compensation claimed under this chapter.
(b) Subsection (2)(a) applies to a claim for compensation for:
(i) temporary total disability benefits;
(ii) temporary partial disability benefits;
(iii) permanent partial disability benefits; or
(iv) permanent total disability benefits.
(c) The commission may enter an order awarding or denying an
employee's claim for compensation under this chapter within a reasonable
time period beyond 12 years from the date of the accident, if:
(i) t h e employee complies with Subsection (2)(a); and
(ii) 12 years from the date of the accident:
(A) (I) the employee is fully cooperating in a commission
approved reemployment plan; and
(II) the results of t h a t commission approved reemployment plan are not known; or
(B) the employee is actively adjudicating issues of compensability before t h e commission.
(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an application for hearing is
filed within one year of t h e date of death of the employee.
(4) (a) (i) Subject to Subsections (2)(c) and (4)(b), after an employee files an
application for hearing within six years from the date of the accident,
the Division ofAdjudication may enter a n order to show cause why the
employee's claim should not be dismissed because the employee h a s
failed to meet t h e employee's burden of proof to establish an entitlement to compensation claimed in the application for hearing.
(ii) The order described in Subsection (4)(a)(i) may be entered on
the motion of the:
(A) Division of Adjudication;
(B) employee's employer; or
(C) employer's insurance carrier.
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a), the Division of Adjudication may dismiss a
claim:
(i) without prejudice; or
(ii) with prejudice only if:
(A) the Division of Adjudication adjudicates the merits of the
employee's entitlement to the compensation claimed in the application for hearing; or
(B) the employee fails to comply with Subsection (2)(a)(ii).
(c) If a claim is dismissed without prejudice under Subsection (4)(b), the
employee is subject to the time limits under Subsection (2)(a) to claim
compensation under this chapter.
(5) A claim for compensation under this chapter is subject to a claim or hen
for recovery under Section 26-19-5.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT

63-46b-7

History: C. 1953, 63-46b-5, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 261; 1988, ch. 72, § 17.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Driver License Services hearing. Brinkerhoff v.
Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).

Procedural errors.
Cited.
Procedural errors
Trial de novo cured any technical procedural
errors occurring at an informal Division of

Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
830 R2d
State L a n d s & Forest^
(Utah 1992).

v . Board of
' *^*®£*
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63-46b-6. Procedures for formal adjudicative
ceedings — Responsive pleadings.

pro-

(1) In all formal adjudicative proceedings, unless modified by rule according
to Subsection 63-46b-3(5), the respondent, if any, shall file and serve a written
response signed by the respondent or the respondent's representative within
30 days of the mailing date or last date of publication of the notice of agency
action or the notice under Subsection 63-46b-3(3)(d), which shall include:
(a) the agency's file number or other reference number;
(b) the name of the adjudicative proceeding;
(c) a statement of the relief that the respondent seeks;
(d) a statement of the facts; and
(e) a statement summarizing the reasons that the relief requested
should be granted.
(2) The respondent shall send a copy of the response filed under Subsection
(1) to each party
(3) The presiding officer, or the agency by rule, may permit or require
pleadings in addition to the notice of agency action, the request for agency
action, and the response. All documents permitted or required to be filed shall
be filed with the agency and one copy shall be sent to each party
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-6, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 262; 1988, ch. 72, § 18; 2001,
ch. 138, § 14.
Amendment Notes. — The 2001
amendment, effective April 30,2001, inSubsection (2) substituted the present provisions for

"The response shall be filed with the agency
and one copy shall be sent by mail to each
party," in Subsection (3) substituted
"documents'* for "papers* and deleted "by mail"
before "to each party," and made a stylistic
change.

63-46b-7. Procedures for formal adjudicative
ceedings — Discovery and subpoenas.

pro-

(1) In formal adjudicative proceedings, the agency may, by rule, prescribe
means of discovery adequate to permit the parties to obtain all relevant
information necessary to support their claims or defenses. If the agency does
not enact rules under this section, the parties may conduct discovery according
to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) Subpoenas and other orders to secure the attendance of witnesses or the
production of evidence in formal adjudicative proceedings shall be issued by
the presiding officer when requested by any party, or may be issued by the
presiding officer on his own motion.
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APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
JOHNNY ALBERT,
Petitioner,
vs.
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT
and WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND;
QUALITY PLATTING CO and
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND;
BARNARD & BURK GROUP, INC. and
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS.;
|
AMERITEMPS, INC. and HARTFORD
INS.; TRANSWEST CONSTRUCTION;
UNINSURANCED EMPLOYERS' FUND
and EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND,

ORDER DENYING REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION
Case Nos. 97-0576,99-1213,
99-1214,01-1070,01-1071,
01-1072,01-1073, & 02-0595

Respondents.

Barnard & Burk and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, National Union Fire
Insurance (referred to jointly as "Barnard" hereafter), ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor
Commission to reconsider its prior determination awarding benefits to Johnny Albert under the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.).
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §6346b-13.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Judge La Jeunesse ordered Barnard to pay permanent partial disability compensation and
medical expenses arising from a back injury Mr. Albert suffered at Barnard on January 21, 1991.
Barnard then sought Appeals Board review of Judge La Jeunesse's decision on the grounds that Mr.
Albert's claim for medical expenses is barred by §417(1) of the Act and his claim for permanent
partial disability compensation is barred by § 417(2) of the Act. In response, Mr. Albert argued that,
because Barnard failed to raise its §417 defenses in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim, Barnard waived
those defenses.
In its decision issued May 3,2004, the Appeals Board concluded that Barnard had waived its
§417 defenses. The Appeals Board therefore affirmed Judge La Jeunesse's award of benefits to Mr.
Albert. Barnard now asks the Appeals Board to reconsider its decision. Barnard argues that it: 1)
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was under no obligation to raise its §417(1) defense in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim; and 2) did,
in fact, adequately raise its §417 defenses.
DISCUSSION
Barnard's obligation to raise its §417(1) defense. Section § 417(1) of the Act contains the
following restriction to an injured worker's right to receive medical treatment for work-related
injuries (emphasis added):
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disability
cases an employees medical benefit entitlement ceases if for a period of three
consecutive years the employee does not:
(a) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident; and
(b) submit the medical expenses incurred to the employee's employer or insurance
carrier for payment.
Barnard argues that it was not required to raise the foregoing statute's three year "incur and
submit" requirement as a defense in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim because the defense only
applies to "nonpermanent total disability cases," and at the time Barnard filed its answer, Mr.
Albert's claim was for permanent total disability.
As a preliminary matter, the Appeals Board notes that Barnard failed to raise this issue in its
original motion for review. Section 63-46b-12(l)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
requires a party seeking agency review to "state the grounds for review." This requirement is
necessary to avoid piecemeal review proceedings. Because Barnard failed to raise this issue as a
grounds for review in its initial motion for review, the Appeals Board declines to consider the issue
for the first time as part of this reconsideration proceeding.
But even if the Appeals Board were to consider the merits of Barnard's new argument, the
Appeals Board would reject that argument. Mr. Albert's application for hearing made a claim for
both permanent total disability compensation and medical benefits. The claim for medical benefits
was not dependent upon the claim for permanent total disability compensation. It was therefore
Barnard's obligation to raise in its answer all its defenses to the medical claim, including its §417(1)
defense.
Sufficiency of Barnard's §417 defenses. Having concluded that Barnard was required to raise
its §417 defenses in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim, the Appeals Board must consider whether
Barnard did so. Barnard's answer contained only vague and tentative references to statutes of
limitation and notice provisions that might be found somewhere in the Workers' Compensation Act
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or Occupational Disease Act. Barnard's answer did not "state all affirmative defenses with sufficient
accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully informed of the nature of the defense asserted," as
required by the Commission's Rule 602-2-1 .D.
Barnard aigues thaX «ven \i i\s axfswti ^ a s YIO\ s\tf&ifcn\\mde* \he Coixmisswrf s Rxife 6Q2-21 .D to preserve its §417 defenses, its answer was sufficient under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and appellate precedent interpreting those rules. However, it is the Commission's rules that govern
adjudicative process before the Commission. Consequently, the Appeals Board looks to the
Commission's Rule R602-2-1.D, rather than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to evaluate the
sufficiency of Barnard's answer.
For the reasons already discussed in this decision and in the Appeals Board's previous
decision, the Appeals Board concludes that Barnard's answer did not raise its §417 defenses and that
those defenses were, therefore, waived.
ORDER
The Commission reaffirms its previous decision and denies Barnard's request for
reconsideration. It is so ordered.
Dated this / t f ^ d a y of October, 2004.

-SZ>ST&^

Colleen Colton, Chair

Patricia S. Drawe

Jo!>se^)h E. Hatch

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For Review
with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Reconsideration in the matter
of Johnny Albert, Case Nos. 97-0576,99-1213,99-1214,01-1070,01-1071,01-1072,01-1073 & 020959, was mailed, first class, postage prepaid this /tf^clay of October, 2004, to the following:
JOHNNY ALBERT
2550 WEST 2780 SOUTH #171
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT
1575 WEST 2550 SOUTH
OGDENUT 84401
ELLIOT MORRIS, ATTORNEY
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107
FLOYD HOLM, ATTORNEY
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107
QUALITY PLATING
2087 WEST 2425 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84097
BARNARD & BURK GROUP INC
P O BOX 117
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS.
AIGCA
101 CONVENTION CENTER #1100
LAS VEGAS NV 89109
AMERITEMPS INC.
716 EAST 4500 SOUTH
MURRAY UT 84107
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HARTFORD INS.
P O BOX 22815
DENVER CO 80222
TRANSWEST CONSTRUCTION
(address unavailable)
ELLIOT LAWRENCE, ATTORNEY
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND
P O BOX 146600
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
RICHARD BURKE, ATTORNEY
648 EAST 100 SOUTH #200
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102
CARRIE TAYLOR, ATTORNEY
P O BOX 2465
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110-2465
THEODORE KANELL, ATTORNEY
136 E SOUTH TEMPLE #1700
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission
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APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
JOHNNY ALBERT,
ORDER ON
MOTIONS FOR REVIEW

Applicant,

AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT
*
and WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; *
QUALITY PLATING and WORKERS
*
COMPENSATION FUND; BARNARD & *
BURK GROUP, INC. and NATIONAL
*
UNION FIRE INS.; AMERITEMPS, INC. *
and HARTFORD INS.; TRANSWEST
*
CONSTRUCTION; UNINSURED
*
EMPLOYERS' FUND; EMPLOYERS'
*
REINSURANCE FUND,
*
Defendants.

Case Nos. 97-0576,
99-1213,99-1214
01-1070,01-1071,
01-1072,01-1073,
and 02-0595

*

Quality Plating, Barnard & Burk, and Ameritemps, by and through their respective insurance
carriers, ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge
La Jeunesse's decision regarding Johnny Albert's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.).
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED
Over the course of many years, while working for several different employers, Mr. Albert
suffered a series of injuries to his low back, right foot and left foot. In addition to these work
injuries, Mr. Albert is intellectually and emotionally challenged. He now seeks disability and
medical benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The parties agree that Mr. Albert's physical, intellectual and emotional problems have left
him permanently and totally disabled. They disagree over the specific benefits Mr. Albert is entitled
to receive, and their respective liabilities for those benefits. To resolve these questions, Judge La
Jeunesse held an evidentiary hearing on December 17,2002. On July 22,2003, Judge La Jeunesse
issued his decision, which can be summarized as follows:
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•
Transwest, the Uninsured Employers' Fund, and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund were
relieved of any liability for Mr. Albert's claims.
•
Quality Plating and its insurance carrier, Workers Compensation Fund (referred to j ointly
as "Quality"), were ordered to pay temporary total disability compensation, permanent partial
disability compensation and medical expenses for low back injuries Mr. Albert suffered while
working for Quality on June 18, 1990.
• Barnard & Burk and its insurance carrier, National Union Fire Insurance ("Barnard"),
were ordered to pay permanent partial disability compensation and medical expenses for a
second low back injury that Mr. Albert suffered while working for Barnard on January 21,
1991.
•
American Asbestos Abatement and its insurance carrier, Workers Compensation Fund
("American"), were ordered to pay medical expenses for a third low back injury Mr. Albert
suffered while working for American on July 28, 1991.
• Ameritemps and its insurance carrier, Hartford Insurance ("Ameritemps"), were ordered
to pay permanent total disability compensation beginning June 16, 1997, and medical
expenses for a left foot injury Mr. Albert suffered while working for American on June 16,
1997.
Quality, Barnard and Ameritemps now request review of Judge La Jeunesse's decision.
Quality contests its liability for medical expenses. Barnard contests its liability for medical expenses
and permanent partial disability compensation. Ameritemps contends it is not liable for Mr. Albert's
permanent total disability compensation.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission affirms and adopts Judge La Jeunesse's findings of fact. Those facts are
summarized below and are also supplemented by the Appeals Board's additional findings relative to
the specific issues raised in the parties' motions for review.
Working for Quality on June 18, 1990, Mr. Albert injured his low back while lifting some
metal plates. He received medical attention and was off work for one week. He incurred a 2 lA %
whole person impairment as a result of this back injury. Thereafter, Mr. Albert submitted no other
medical expenses to Quality for payment. However, in his application for hearing against Quality,
filed on October 3,2001, Mr. Albert claimed additional medical expenses. Quality's answer to Mr.
Albert's application reported that "(t)he last benefits provided in this matter were paid on July 6,
1990. Workers' Compensation Fund has received no other medical bills . . . ." Quality's answer
then denied liability for further medical expense on the grounds such liability was barred "by the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 34A-2-417."
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While working for Barnard on January 21, 1991, Mr. Albert slipped, fell on a pipe and
injured his low back. He received medical attention at the time, but did not miss any work. This
injury resulted in an additional 2 lA % permanent whole person impairment. In his application for
hearing against Barnard filed on October 3, 2001, Mr. Albert claimed additional medical and
disability benefits for the January 1991 injury. Barnard's answer included as its "Seventh Defense" a
statement that "Defendants affirmatively allege the applicant's claims are or may be barred or limited
by the statutes of limitation and/or notice provisions contained in Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2 et
seq., § 34A-3 et seq. and § 35-1 et seq."
On July 28, 1991, Mr. Albert injured his right foot while working at American Asbestos.
This injury caused a 9% permanent whole person impairment. After a lengthy period of recovery,
Mr. Albert was able to return to work, this time with Ameritemps.
Nine months after beginning employment with Ameritemps, Mr. Albert crushed his left great
toe in a work-related accident. This injury required four surgeries, over a period of 13 months. Mr.
Albert did not reach medical stability until February 25, 1999, and then was left with a 4%
permanent whole person impairment. Mr. Albert has been unable to work since the accident at
Ameritemps on June 16, 1997.
In addition to Mr. Albert's work-place injuries and resulting impairments, he has a low IQ
and severe deficits in memory, concentration, judgment and other mental functions. He also suffers
from significant depression that constitutes a 30% whole-person impairment, 1/3 of which is
attributable to the injuries and chronic pain from his work accidents..
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As already noted, Quality, Barnard and Ameritemps request review of Judge La Jeunesse's
decision. Their respective arguments are addressed separately below.
Quality's liability for medical expenses. The only part of Judge La Jeunesse's Order
challenged by Quality is the directive that Quality pay ongoing medical expenses necessary to treat
Mr. Albert's back injuries from his accident at Quality on June 18, 1990. In arguing that it has no
further liability for these medical expense, Quality relies on the affirmative defense established by §
417(1) of the Act:
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disability
cases an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if for a period of three
consecutive years the employee does not:
(a) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident; and
(b) submit the medical expenses incurred to the employee's employer or insurance
carrier for payment.
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Quality contends that, because Mr. Albert did not submit any medical expenses for payment
after 1990, the "three year" provision of § 417(1) ends his right to future payments of medical
expenses. In response, Mr. Albert argues that Quality cannot assert § 417(1) as an affirmative
defense because Quality failed to adequately raise that defense in its answer to Mr, Albert's
application.
Commission Rule R602-2-1.D addresses the content requirements that apply to answers in
workers' compensation proceedings:
The employer or insurance carrier shall have 30 days following the date of the
mailing of the application to file a written answer with the Commission, admitting or
denying liability for the claim. The answer shall state all affirmative defenses with
sufficient accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully informed of the nature of
the defense asserted.... (emphasis added)
The objective of Rule R602-2-1.D is to give applicants reasonable advance notice of
affirmative defenses so that they can investigate the facts and prepare a response. Quality asserted
§417( 1) as an affirmative defense not only by citing § 417 itself, but also by stating the factual basis
that supported the defense. The Appeals Board finds that Quality's answer contained "sufficient
accuracy and detail" to allow Mr. Albert to be "fully informed of the nature of the defense asserted,"
and thereby satisfied Rule R602-2-l.D's requirements
Having concluded that Quality properly raised its §417(1) defense, the Appeals Board turns
to the merits of that defense. There is no evidence that Mr. Albert submitted any medical expenses
to Quality after 1990. Therefore, by operation of § 417(1), Quality's obligation to pay for medical
treatment related to Mr. Albert's accident of June 18, 1990, has now ended. Judge La Jeunesse's
order will be modified accordingly.
Barnard's liability for medical and disability benefits. Judge La Jeunesse ordered Barnard to
pay permanent partial disability compensation and medical expenses arisingfromthe back injury Mr.
Albert suffered at Barnard on January 21,1991. Barnard challenges Judge La Jeunesse's Order on
the grounds that Mr. Albert's claim for medical expenses is barred by §417(1), and his claim for
permanent partial disability compensation is barred by § 417(2). Mr. Albert responds by arguing
that, because Barnard failed to adequately raise its §417 defenses in its answer, those defenses are
waived.
As already discussed in the preceding section of this decision, § 417(1) establishes an
affirmative defense to ongoing liability for medical care if the injured worker does not, for a period
of three years, 1) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident and 2) submit
the medical expenses incurred to the employee's employer or insurance carrier for payment.
Similarly, § 417(2) provides an affirmative defense to claims for permanent partial disability
compensation if no application for such compensation has been filed within six years from the date
of the accident. But affirmative defenses are waived if not properly raised, and the Commission's
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Rule R602-2-1.D requires the employer or insurance carrier to state in their answers ". . . all
affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully informed of
the nature of the defense asserted...."
In the previous part of this decision, the Appeals Board concluded that Quality had raised its
§417(1) defense with sufficient accuracy and detail to satisfy Rule R602-2-1.D, in that Quality
specifically cited the statute and also set out the factual basis for application of the statute. In
contrast to Quality's specificity, Barnard's answer does not reference § 417, but instead refers in very
broad terms to old and current versions of the entire Workers' Compensation Act and the entire
Occupational Disease Act. Furthermore, Barnard's answer states no factual basis to support its § 417
defenses.
It bears repeating that the purpose behind Rule R602-2-1.D is to require parties relying on
affirmative defenses to provide reasonable advance notice of those defenses so that the parties who
must respond to those defenses have time to investigate the facts and present their evidence.
Barnard's answer was too vague to meet either the spirit or the letter of the rule and, therefore, failed
to preserve the § 417 defenses that would otherwise have been available to Barnard.
Barnard contends that, even if its answer was inadequate to raise its §417 defenses, it
nevertheless proffered evidence during the evidentiary hearing that was sufficient to raise those
defenses. The Appeals Board disagrees. Rule R602-2-1.D requires that affirmative defenses be
raised in a party's answer, rather than at hearing. But assuming for discussion that the defenses can
be presented for the first time at the evidentiary hearing, nothing in the proffer that Barnard made
during the evidentiary hearing in this case can reasonably be viewed as raising Barnard's § 417
defenses.
Having concluded that Barnard waived its §417 defenses, the Appeals Board turns to
Barnard's contention that a medical panel must be appointed to evaluate Mr. Albert's need for future
medical treatment for the back injury in question. Barnard has not established any of the
circumstances identified by Commission Rule R602-2-2 as justifying appointment of a medical
panel. For that reason, the Appeals Board declines to require appointment of a medical panel.
Ameritemps' liability for permanent total disability compensation. Ameritemps contends it
is not liable for Mr. Albert's permanent total disability compensation because the injury Mr. Albert
suffered while working for Ameritemps is not the cause of his inability to work. Mr. Albert's right
to permanent total disability compensation is governed by § 34A-2-413(b) of the Act, as follows:
To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the
employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of
impairments as a result of the industrial accident... that gives rise to the permanent
total disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
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(iii) the industrial accident . . . was the direct cause of the employee's
permanent total disability.
Ameritemps concedes Mr. Albert satisfies § 413(b)(ii)'s requirement that he is "permanently
and totally disabled." Consequently, the Appeals Board turns to the two remaining requirements of §
413(b): subsection (i)'s requirement of a significant impairment resulting from the accident at
Ameritemps that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; and subsection (iii)'s
requirement that the accident was the direct cause of Mr. Albert's permanent total disability.
The Appeals Board agrees with and adopts Judge La Jeunesse' s reasoning on the two points
in question. Mr. Albert's accident at Ameritemps on June 16,1997, left him with a significant 4%
whole person impairment and also contributed to his already-existing depression. Although Mr.
Albert had other work-related impairments, mental limitations and emotional difficulties before his
accident at Ameritemps, he still had been able to work. After the numerous surgeries, additional
impairment, and extended time away from the labor force that resulted from the Ameritemps
accident, he was no longer able to work. The Appeals Board therefore agrees with Judge La
Jeunesse that Mr. Albert has established 1) a significant impairment resulting from the Ameritemps
accident and 2) that the Ameritemps accident was the direct cause of his permanent total disability.
ORDER
The Appeals Board grants Quality's motion for review and hereby relieves Quality of liability
for Mr. Albert's medical expenses by striking paragraph six of Judge La Jeunesse's "order," found
at page 31 of Judge La Jeunesse's "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order."
The Appeals Board affirms all other parts of Judge La Jeunesse's decision and denies the
Motions for Review of Barnard and Ameritemps.
It is so ordered.
Dated this <$_ day of

; 2004.

Colleen S. Colton, Chair

Patricia S. Drawe

IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the
court within 30 days of the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order On Motions For Review in the matter of Johnny
Albert, Case Nos. 97-0576,99-1213,99-1214J31-1070,01-1071,01-1072,01-1073, and 02-0595,
was mailed first class postage prepaid t h i s , . ^ day ofAprff, 2004, to the following:
JOHNNY ALBERT
2550 WEST 2780 SOUTH #171
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT
1575 WEST 2550 SOUTH
OGDEN UT 84401
ELLIOT MORRIS, ATTORNEY
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107
FLOYD HOLM, ATTORNEY
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107
QUALITY PLATING
2087 WEST 2425 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84097
BARNARD & BURK GROUP INC
P O BOX 117
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS.
AIGCA
101 CONVENTION CENTER #1100
LAS VEGAS NV 89109
AMERITEMPS INC.
716 EAST 4500 SOUTH
MURRAY UT 84107
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DENVER CO 80222
TRANSWEST CONSTRUCTION
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LORRIE LIMA, ATTORNEY
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND
P O BOX 146600
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
RICHARD BURKE, ATTORNEY
648 EAST 100 SOUTH #200
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102
CARRIE TAYLOR, ATTORNEY
P O BOX 2465
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110-2465
THEODORE KANELL, ATTORNEY
136 E SOUTH TEMPLE #1700
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

>ara Danielson
Support Specialist
Utah Labor Commission
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Appendix D

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
P.O. BOX 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
Case Nos. 97576,991213,991214,20011070,20011071,20011072,20011073, and 2002595

FINDINGS OF FACT,

JOHNNY ALBERT,
Petitioner,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER

vs.
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT
and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION
FUND; QUALITY PLATING and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND;
BARNARD & BURK GROUP, INC.
and/or NATIONAL UNION FDtE INS.;
AMERITEMPS, INC. and/or
HARTFORD INS.; TRANSWEST
CONSTRUCTION; UNINSURED
EMPLOYERS' FUND; EMPLOYERS'
REINSURANCE FUND,

Judge: Richard M. La Jeunesse

Respondents,
************************

HEARING:

Room 334, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
on December 17,2002 at 08:30 a.m. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order
and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard M. La Jeunesse, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The petitioner, Johnny Albert, was present and represented by his attorney
Richard Burke.
The respondents, Quality Plating and Workers Compensation Fund
(hereinafter collectively referred to as Quality), were represented by
attorney Elliott K. Morris.
The respondents, American Asbestos Abatement and Workers
Compensation Fund (hereinafter collectively referred to as American
Asbestos), were represented by attorney Floyd W. Holm.
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The respondents, Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and National Union Fire
Ins. (hereinafter collectively referred to as Barnard & Burk) , were
represented by attorney Carrie Taylor.
The respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. (hereinafter
collectively referred to as Ameritemps), were represented by attorney
Theodore E. Kanell.
The respondents, Uninsured Employers' Fund and Employers'
Reinsurance Fund (hereinafter referred to as UEF and ERF respectively),
were represented by attorney Sherrie Hayashi.
The respondent, Transwest Construction (hereinafter Transwest), was a
defunct corporation and did not appear at the hearing. However, the
Uninsured Employers' Fund defended the issues that involved Transwest
at the hearing.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
A.

Claims against Quality Plating and Workers Compensation Fund in
Case Nos. 91000124 and 20011070.

Johnny Albert filed two "Applications For Hearing" with the Utah Labor Commission against
Quality. Mr. Albert filed his first "Application for Hearing9' against Quality on January 24,1991
(Case No. 91000124), and claimed entitlement to the payment of medical expenses associated
with an industrial accident he suffered at Quality on June 18,1990. On July 2, 1991 Judge
Timothy Allen entered an Order (hereinafter the 1991 Order) that resolved the issues raised in
Case No. 91000124.
Mr. Albert filed his second "Application For Hearing" against Quality on October 3,2001 (Case
No. 20011070), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation benefits: (1)
medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability compensation, and; (3) permanent partial
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No.
20011070 arose out of the same industrial accident with Quality that occurred on June 18,1990.
On May 21, 2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case No. 20011070
to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims against Quality in Case No.
20011070 are the claims currently under consideration in the present matter.
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B.

Claims Against American Asbestos Abatement and Workers
Compensation Fund in Case Nos. 93895,97576,991214, and
20011072.

Mr. Albert filed four "Applications For Hearing" with the Utah Labor Commission against
American Asbestos. Mr. Albert filed his first "Application for Hearing" against American
Asbestos" on July 15,1993 (Case No. 93895), and claimed entitlement to: (1) medical expenses;
(2) recommended medical care; (3) temporary total disability compensation, and; (4) permanent
partial disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits against
American Asbestos arose out of an industrial accident that occurred on July 28,1991. On
February 4,1994 Judge Benjamin Sims entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
(hereinafter the 1994 Order) that resolved the issues raised in Case No. 93895.
Mr. Albert filed his second "Application For Hearing" against American Asbestos on July 15,
1997 (Case No. 97576), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation
benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) recommended medical care, and; (3) permanent partial
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No.
97576 arose out of the same industrial accident with American Asbestos that occurred on July
28,1991.
Mr. Albert filed his third "Application For Hearing" against American Asbestos on December
22,1999 (Case No. 991214), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation
benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) recommended medical care, and; (3) permanent partial
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No.
991214 again arose out of the same industrial accident with American Asbestos that occurred on
July 28, 1991.
Mr. Albert filed his fourth "Application For Hearing" against American Asbestos on October 3,
2001 (Case No. 20011072), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation
benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability compensation, and; (3) permanent
partial disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case
No. 20011072 also arose out of the same industrial accident with American Asbestos that
occurred on July 28,1991.
On May 21,2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case Nos. 97576,
991214, and 20011072 to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims
against American Asbestos in Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072 are the claims currently
under consideration in the present matter.
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C.

Claims against Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. in Case Nos.
991213 and 20011073.

Mr. Albert filed two "Applications For Hearing" with the Utah Labor Commission against
Ameritemps. Mr. Albert filed his first "Application for Hearing" against Ameritemps on
December 22, 1999 (Case No. 991213), and claimed entitlement to the payment of medical
expenses together with recommended medical care related to an industrial accident he suffered at
Ameritemps on June 16,1997.
Mr. Albert filed his second "Application For Hearing" against Ameritemps on October 3,2001
(Case No. 20011073), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation benefits:
(1) medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability compensation, and; (3) permanent partial
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No.
20011073 arose out of the same industrial accident with Quality that occurred on June 16,1997.
On May 21, 2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case Nos. 991213
and 20011073 to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims against
Ameritemps in Case Nos. 991213 and 20011073 are the claims currently under consideration in
the present matter.
D.

Claims against Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. National Union Fire Ins.
in Case No. 20011071.

Mr. Albert filed one "Application For Hearing" against Barnard & Burk with the Utah Labor
Commission on October 3,2001 (Case No. 20011071). Mr. Albert claimed entitlement to the
following workers' compensation benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability
compensation, and; (3) permanent partial disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for
workers' compensation benefits in Case No. 20011071 arose out of an industrial accident that
occurred while employed by Barnard & Burk on January 1,1991.
On May 21, 2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case No. 20011071
to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims against Barnard & Burk in
Case No. 20011071 remained under consideration in the present matter.
E.

Claims against Transwest Construction and Uninsured Employers'
Fund in Case No. 2002595.
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Mr. Albert filed one "Application For Hearing" against Transwest with the Utah Labor
Commission on May 21, 2002 (Case No. 2002595). Mr. Albert claimed entitlement to
permanent total disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits
in Case No. 2002595 arose out of an industrial accident that occurred while employed by
Transwest on November 4, 1982.
F.

Position of the Respondents.

The respondents conceded that Mr. Albert was permanently and totally disabled. However, each
of the respondents alleged that an injury other than the one respectively defended by the
individual respondents directly caused Mr. Albert's permanent total disability. Quality Plating
also claimed that the industrial accident of June 8,1990 came up short as the legal cause of Mr.
Albert's back problems.
G.

The Hearing on December 17,2002.

At the conclusion of the hearing on December 17,2002,1 agreed to leave the evidentiary record
open 30 days for the receipt of some additional medical records. On January 14,20031 received
the anticipated medical records and closed the evidentiary record.
H. ISSUES.
1.

What is the direct cause of Johnny Albert's permanent total disability?

2.

Which of the respondents, if any, owe Johnny Albert permanent total disability
compensation?
IH. FINDINGS OF FACT
A.

Employment and Compensation Rates.
1.

Transwest Construction.

No dispute existed that Transwest employed Mr. Albert on November 4,1982. At the time of
the November 4,1982 industrial accident at Transwest, Mr. Albert was not married and had no
dependent children.
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Mr. Albert listed on his "Application for Hearing" against Transwest a wage rate of $9.00 per
hour, and a 40 hour per workweek average. At the hearing Mr. Albert testified that he earned
$8.00 per hour from Transwest, and worked a 40 hour week on average. When confronted with
the wage rate set forth on the Employers' First Report of Injury in Exhibit "6," Mr. Albert
conceded he probably earned $4.00 per hour and worked 40 hours per week on average.
The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case established that at the time of his
industrial accident with Transwest on November 4,1982, Mr. Albert earned $4.00 per hour and
worked 40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate workers'
compensation rate with Transwest equaled $107.00 per week. [$4.00/hour x 40 hours/week =
$160.00/week x 2/3 = $107.00/week].
2.

QuaUty Plating.

No dispute existed that Quality employed Mr. Albert on June 18,1990. At the time of the June
18, 1990 industrial accident at Quality, Mr. Albert was not married, but had one dependent child.
In Case No. 20011070 involving QuaUty, Mr. Albert listed on his "Application for Hearing" a
wage rate of $5.50 per hour together with a 40 hour per workweek average. At the hearing Mr.
Albert testified that he earned $9.00 per hour from Quality, and worked a 40 hour week on
average. Exhibit "7," The Employers' First Report of Injury filed by QuaUty with respect to the
June 18,1990 industrial accident, listed a wage rate for Mr. Albert of $5.50 per hour.
The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case established that at the time of his
industrial accident with Quality on June 18,1990, Mr. Albert earned $5.50 per hour and worked
40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate workers' compensation
rate with Quality equaled $152.00 per week. [$5.50/hour x 40 hours/week = $220.00/week x 2/3
= $146.66/week + 5.00/week (dependent's allowance) = $152.00/week (rounded to nearest whole
dollar)].
3.

Barnard & Burk.

No dispute existed that Barnard & Burk employed Mr. Albert on January 21,1991. At the time
of the January 21,1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk, Mr. Albert was not married, but
had one dependent child.
Mr. Albert's testimony at the hearing on December 17,2002 provided the unrefuted evidence
concerning his wage rate with Barnard & Burk on January 21, 1991. Mr. Albert earned an
average weekly wage of $473.20 from Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate
temporary total disability compensation rate equaled $320.00 per week. [$473.20 x
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2/3 = 315.46/week + $5.00/week (dependent's allowance) = $320.00 rounded to the nearest
whole dollar)]. The maximum permanent partial disability compensation rate as of January 21,
1991 equaled $243.00 per week. The maximum permanent total disability compensation rate as
of January 21,1991 equaled $309.00 per week.
4.

American Asbestos Abatement

Judge Sims in his February 4,1994 Order determined the appropriate workers' compensation
rates for Mr. Albert's July 28,1991 industrial accident with American Asbestos. Judge Sims
concluded that Mr. Albert's weekly wage rate equaled $510.20 per week as of July 28,1991
[1994 Order at p. 3], which yielded: (1) a temporary total disabihty compensation rate of $345.00
per week [id. at p. 5]; (2) a permanent partial disabihty compensation rate of $252.00 per week
[id. at p. 6], and; (3) a permanent total disability compensation rate of $252.00 per week. I
adopted the findings and conclusions of the 1984 Order insofar as consistent with the present
Order.
5.

Ameritemps, Inc.

No dispute existed that Ameritemps employed Mr. Albert on June 16,1997. At the time of the
June 16,1997 industrial accident at Ameritemps, Mr. Albert was not married, but had two
dependent children.
Mr. Albert provided four different wage rates with respect to his employment at Ameritemps. In
Case No. 991213 involving Ameritemps, Mr. Albert listed on his "Application for Hearing" a
wage rate of $9.00 per hour together with a 50 hour per workweek average. In case No.
20011073 against Ameritemps, Mr. Albert set forth in his "Application for Hearing" a wage rate
of $8.00 per hour, and a 32 hour per workweek average. In his "Amended Application for
Hearing" filed in Case No. 20011073 Mr. Albert claimed his appropriate temporary total
disability compensation rate should equal $292.33 per week consistent with a "Compensation
Agreement" between Mr. Albert and Ameritemps executed on March 29,1999. At the hearing
Mr. Albert testified that he earned $9.00 per hour from Ameritemps, and worked a 40 hour week
on average.
Ameritemps introduced into evidence Exhibit "2," a payroll history of Mr. Albert with
Ameritemps from May 17,1997, to June 21,1997. Exhibit "2" set forth precise information
concerning Mr. Albert's wages in the five weeks leading up to his industrial accident on June 16,
1997:
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Pay Day

Weekly Gross Pay

May 17,1997

$399.20

May 24,1997

$262.40

May 31,1997

$370.40

June 7,1997

$400.16

June 14,1997

$290.40

Total

$1,722.56'

The best evidence in this case concerning Mr. Albert's average weekly wage with Ameritemps at
the time of his industrial accident on June 16,1997 came from his actual payroll history
contained in Exhibit "2." The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case
established that Mr. Albert's weekly wage with Ameritemps at the time of his industrial accident
on June 16,1997 averaged $344.51. [$1,722.56 + 5 weeks = $344.51/week]. Accordingly, Mr.
Albert's appropriate workers' compensation rate with Ameritemps equaled $240.00 per week.
[$344.51/week x 2/3 = $229.67/week + 10,00/week (dependents' allowance) = $240.00/week
(rounded to nearest whole dollar)].
B.

The Respective Industrial Accidents and Consequent Injuries.
1.

The November 4,1982 Industrial Accident with Transwest
Construction Case No. 2002595.

The essential facts of Mr. Albert's November 4,1982 industrial accident at Transwest stood
undisputed by the parties. On November 4,1982 Mr. Albert worked at Transwest building
trusses. A stack of the trusses fell over on his low back. Mr. Albert pushed himself out from
under the trusses.
Mr. Albert remained off of work with low back pain for one week following the November 4,
1982 industrial accident at Transwest. Mr. Albert claimed that between 1982, and 1990, he
sustained no further injuries to his low back.

1

1 did not factor in the last check received by Mr. Albert on June 21,1997, because his
industrial accident occurred on June 16,1997 affecting the number of hours he worked that
week.
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a.

Injuries Caused by the November 4,1982 Industrial Accident
at Transwest Construction.

The parties concurred that no contemporaneous medical records could be located with respect to
the injuries caused by Mr. Albert's November 4,1982 industrial accident. Of the many medical
opinions in this case, only Dr. Joel Dall M.D. and Dr. Scott Knorp M.D. addressed Mr. Albert's
low back problems in connection with the November 4,1982 industrial accident at Transwest.
On August 15, 2002 Dr. Dall diagnosed Mr. Albert with "Chronic low back pain,
multifactoral...." [Exhibit "J-l" at 113]. Dr. Dall rated Mr. Albert's low back condition:
[c]omplaints of low back pain .... [b]ased on his description and my examination
today, I feel he would best fall into Category 1C (see page 16 in Utah's 2002
Impairment Guides) which is awarded five percent whole person impairment, [id.
at 115].
Dr. Dall determined that:
[b]ased on the fact that he lost no time from work I would apportion 0 percent of
his back injury to the incident at Tram Core2 on 11-18-19823." [id.].
On November 25,2002 Dr. Knorp also diagnosed Mr. Albert with "Nonspecific subjective low
back pain...." [id. at 21]. Dr. Knorp commented concerning a rating for Mr. Albert's low back
condition:
Quite frankly, it is my best medical judgment that there is no objective medical
evidence, and certainly no consistent or reliable historical information to support
any ratable impairment offered on behalf of Mr. Albert with respect to his spinal
complaints, [id. at 26] .4

2

Actually Transwest.

3

As determined supra Mr. Albert's industrial accident at Transwest in fact occurred on
November 4,1982.
4

Dr. Knorp in another portion of his opinion seemed to hedge his bets with a facetious
3% whole person impairment rating postulated by cynically disregarding all of what Dr. Knorp
deemed valid objective medical and historical evidence, [id. at 26]. Accordingly, I gave no
consideration to Dr. Knorp's ironic 3% impairment rating.
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The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case supported the opinion rendered by
Dr. Dall that Mr. Albert suffered from chronic low back pain, which resulted in a 5% whole
person impairment.5 The medical record in this case contained a consistent chronology of
treatment for back pain suffered by Mr. Albert over a span of years, [see gen: id. at pp. 147-148,
150,254-258, 260-300, 302, 310-318]. However, Dr. Dall apportioned none of Mr. Albert's 5%
permanent partial impairment to his industrial accident of November 4,1982. Therefore, while
Mr. Albert suffered from chronic back pain that resulted in a 5% whole person impairment, none
of his rated low back problems derived from the remote November 1982 industrial accident at
Transwest
b.

Workers' Compensation Benefits Owed by Transwest
Construction and/or Uninsured Employers' Fund as a Result
of Johnny Albert's November 4,1982 Industrial Accident

Mr. Albert's single "Application for Hearing" against Transwest and UEF as represented in Case
No. 2002595 claimed only permanent total disability compensation. As set forth in Section
Hl.C.l.a. supra Mr. Albert suffered no permanent impairment from his November 4,1982
industrial accident with Transwest. Consequently, Mr. Albert's November 4,1982 industrial
accident could not have caused his permanent total disability. Therefore, Mr. Albert's claim
against Transwest and UEF for permanent total disability compensation must be dismissed with
prejudice.
2.

The June 18,1990 Industrial Accident with Quality Plating Case No.
20011070.
a.

Injuries Caused by the June 18,1990 Industrial Accident at
Quality Plating.

No dispute existed concerning the essential facts of Mr. Albert's industrial accident at Quality.
On June 18,1990 Mr. Albert picked up a stack of metal plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds, and
put them on a table. While he lifted the plates Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Mr. Albert
remained off work for one week and treated with a chiropractor for his low back problems
sustained in the June 18,1990 industrial accident. Dr. Dall apportioned half of Mr. Albert's 5%
whole person impairment from his chronic low back pain to the June 18,1990 incident.

5

Utah Administrative Code R. 602-2-2.A.2. requires that a medical controversy over an
impairment rating over 5% be sent to a medical panel for consideration. In the present matter the
discrepancy between Dr. Knorp's 0% impairment rating and Dr. DalPs 5% whole person
impairment rating did not exceed 5%. Therefore no necessity existed for the referral of this issue
to a medical panel.
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b.

The Issue of Legal Causation as Applied to Johnny Albert's
June 18,1990 Industrial Accident.

On June 18,1990 Mr. Albert lifted a stack of steel plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds and put
them on a table. Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Mr. Albert went to Dr. Theodore Conger D.C.
for treatment of his low back. [id. at 289]. Dr. Conger filed a "Physician's Initial report of Work
Injury" on June 23,1990. [id.].
Quality argued that Mr. Albert could not establish legal causation between his industrial accident
on June 18,1990, and the low back problems he complained of thereafter. As set forth in
Section IH.C.l.a. no contemporary records existed that documented the nature of Mr. Albert's
low back injury on November 4,1982. Further, Dr. Dall apportioned none of Mr. Albert's
ratable low back impairment to the November 4,1982 industrial accident. Finally, no medical
records existed that showed Mr. Albert suffered from any ongoing low back problems between
his accident on November 4, 1982, and the accident of June 18,1990. In short, Quality failed to
establish that Mr. Albert suffered from preexisting low back problems of the nature and kind he
sustained on June 18,1990. Therefore, Mr. Albert had no need to jump the higher legal
causation hurdle enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729
P. 2d 15, 24-25 (Utah 1986).
c.

Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident

Mr. Albert remained off work from Quality six days from June 19,1990, to Jxme 25,1990, when
Dr. Conger released him back to work. [Exhibit "J-l" at 289]. Consequently, Qaulity and/or
WCF owed Mr. Albert $65.36 in temporary total disability compensation for the six days, minus
three, he missed work due to the June 18,1990 industrial accident at Quality.6 [$152.00/week x
$.43 weeks (three days) = $65.36].
d.

Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident

6

Utah Code §34A-2-408, formerly Utah Code §35-1-64, does not allow temporary total
disability compensation for the first three days of the disability unless the disability lasts more
than 14 days.
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Dr. Dall apportioned half of Mr. Albert's 5% whole person impairment due to chronic low back
pain to the June 18,1990 industrial accident at Quality. [Exhibit "J-l" at 115]. As set forth in
Section m.C.l.a. the preponderance of the evidence in this case favored the opinion of Dr. Dall
as to Mr. Albert's low back impairment. Therefore, Quality and/or WCF owed Mr. Albert
$1,185.60 in permanent partial disability compensation for a 2lA % whole person impairment
caused by the June 18,1990 industrial accident. [$152.00/week x 312 weeks x 0.025 =
$1,185.60].
e.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident

For the reasons set forth in Section 1E.C.2. infra the injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the June
18,1990 did not constitute the direct cause of his permanent total disability. Therefore, Quality
and WCF did not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation.
3.

The January 21,1991 Industrial Accident with Barnard & Burk
Group, Inc. Case No. 20011071.
a.

Injuries Caused by the January 21,1991 Industrial Accident at
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc.

The essential facts of Mr. Albert's January 21,1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk came
in undisputed. On January 21, 1991 Mr. Albert worked for Bamard & Burk removing asbestos
at the Chevron Refinery. Mr. Albert slipped, fell, and landed on a pipe with his low back. Mr.
Albert described his low back as "all messed up" and went to a chiropractor for treatment. On
January 22,1991 Dr. Conger filed a "Physician's Initial report of Work Injury" with respect to
Mr. Albert's January 21,1991 industrial accident with Barnard & Burk. [id. at 260].
b.

Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins.
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial
Accident

At the hearing, Mr. Albert did not identify any periods of time he missed work due to the January
21,2001 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Barnard & Burk owed Mr. Albert
no temporary total disability as a result of the January 21,1991 industrial accident.
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e.

Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins.
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial
Accident

Dr. Dall apportioned half of Mr. Albert's 5% whole person impairment due to chronic low back
pain to the January 21,1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. [id. at 115]. As set forth in
Section IH.C.l.a. the preponderance of the evidence in this case favored the opinion of Dr. Dall
as to Mr. Albert's low back impairment. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and National Union owed
Mr. Albert $1,895.40 in permanent partial disability compensation consequent to the January 21,
2001 industrial accident. [$243.00/week x 312 weeks x 0.025 = $1,895.40].
d.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins.
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial
Accident

For the reasons set forth in Section DI.C.2. infra the injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the
January 21,2001 industrial accident did not constitute the direct cause of his permanent total
disability. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and National Union did not owe Mr. Albert permanent
total disability compensation.
4.

The July 28,1991 Industrial Accident with American Asbestos
Abatement Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072.
a.

Injuries Caused by the July 28,1991 Industrial Accident at
American Asbestos Abatement

No dispute existed concerning the facts of Mr. Albert's July 28,1991 industrial accident. On
July 28, 1991 Mr. Albert worked for American Asbestos at Hill Air Force Base. Mr. Albert fell
more than twenty feet from a scaffold and landed primarily on his right foot.
On July 30,1991 Dr. Kenneth Jee M.D. diagnosed Mr. Albert with a: "right comminuted
calcaneus7 fracture." [id. at 377]. Also on July 30,2001 Dr. Jee operated on Mr. Albert and
performed a:
Closed reduction with percutaneous pin manipulation and fixation right
comminuted calcaneus fracture, [id.].

7

Largest of the tarsal bones that form the heel of the foot.
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On July 24,1992 Dr. David Howe M.D. concluded that Mr. Albert still suffered from:
"Traumatic arthritis subtalar joint right foot." [id. at 367]. Also on July 24,1992 Dr. Howe
performed the second operation on Mr. Albert's right foot a: "Subtalar arthrodesis8 with bone
graft from right illiac crest." On March 17,1993 Dr. Howe in a third operative procedure on Mr.
Albert's right foot removed the hardware from the second operation, [id. at 370].
Judge Sim's 1994 Order concluded that Mr. Albert's right foot injury caused by his industrial
accident of July 28,1991 resulted in a "nine percent whole person impairment." [1994 Order at
p. 4]. As noted in Section LB. supra, I adopted the findings and conclusions contained in the
1994 Order insofar as consistent with the present Order. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's right foot
injury caused by his industrial accident of July 28,1991 resulted in a "nine percent whole person
impairment."
b.

Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability
Compensation Benefits Owed by American Asbestos
Abatement and/or Workers Compensation Fund as a Result of
Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial Accident

As set forth in Section LB. supra, the 1994 Order resolved the issues concerning temporary total
and permanent partial disability compensation owed by American Asbestos and WCF to Mr.
Albert as a result of the July 28,1991 industrial accident. Mr. Albert did not identify any
additional periods of temporary total disability, nor any additional permanent partial impairment,
resultant from the July 28,1991 industrial accident. Accordingly, American Asbestos and WCF
owed Mr. Albert no additional temporary total, nor permanent partial, disability compensation
for the July 21, 1991 industrial accident beyond that set forth in the 1994 Order.
e.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
American Asbestos Abatement and/or Workers Compensation
Fund as a Result of Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial
Accident

For the reasons set forth in Section IH.C.2. infra the injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the July
28,2001 industrial accident did not constitute the direct cause of his permanent total disability.
Therefore, American Asbestos and WCF did not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability
compensation.

Fusion.
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5.

The June 16,1997 Industrial Accident with Ameritemps, Inc. Case
Nos. 991213 and 20011073.
a.

Injuries Caused by the June 16,1997 Industrial Accident at
Ameritemps, Inc.

Again, no dispute existed concerning the factual circumstances of Mr. Albert's June 16,1997
industrial accident with Ameritemps. On June 16,1997 Mr. Albert worked for Ameritemps at
Cisco Foods driving a self-propelled pallet jack. Mr. Albert crushed his left great toe between
the pallet jack and a steel "I" beam.
On June 30,1997 Dr. Stephen Shultz M.D. took an x-ray of Mr. Albert's left foot and
discovered:
Significantly angulated fracture of the first proximal phalanx with probable intraarticular extension. [Exhibit "J-l" at 322].
Also on June 30,1997 Dr. William Burleigh DPM operated on Mr. Albert's left foot, which
consisted of an: "Open-reduction internal fixation, left hallux.9" [id. at 354-355]. On November
14,1997 Dr. Burleigh performed a second operation on Mr. Albert's left foot that involved:
"Arthroplasty hallux left foot." [id. at 342].
On March 11,1998 Dr. Howe diagnosed Mr. Albert with; "Traumatic arthritis to proximate
interphalangeal joint of left great toe." [id. at 368]. Dr. Howe operated on Mr. Albert's left foot
for the third surgical procedure: "Left great toe proximal interphalangeal joint fusion with bone
graft from left tibia." [id.].
On July 31, 1998 Dr. How determined that Mr. Albert had a: "Failed fusion left great toe
interphalangeal joint." [id. at 365]. Consequently, Dr. Howe performed the fourth operation on
Mr. Albert's left foot a repeat: "Fusion of left great toe interphalangeal joint with bone graft from
left tibia." [id.].
On February 25,1999 Dr. Howe gave Mr. Albert an impairment rating for his left foot injuries
sustained in the June 16,1997 industrial accident, [id. at 148]. Dr. Howe found:

9

Great toe.
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In trying to find a partial impairment for the great toe of Johnny's left foot I have
had to go to the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment. 3rd Edition. The 4th Edition only talks about the MP joint
of the great toe, it does not talk about the IP joint of the great toe. From table 24
on page 56, with the IP joint fused at 0 degrees he deserves a 45% impairment of
the great toe. Table 27, page 59 of this correlates to an 8% impairment of the foot
which using table 36 page 65 correlates to a 6% lower extremity impairment
which according to table 46 page 72 correlates to a 2% whole person impairment,
[id.].
On August 15, 2002 Dr. Joel Dall provided an impairment rating for Mr. Albert's left foot
injuries sustained in the June 16,1997 industrial accident, [id. at 115]. Dr. Dall concluded that:
In regards to the toe injury, the Fifth Edition refers to Table 17-30 for impairment
due to ankylosis10 in the toes. His great toe is ankylosed in a position of function
which provides a four percent whole person impairment, [id.].
Because Dr. Dall used the more current and applicable Fifth Edition to the American Medical
Associations Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, I found his impairment rating
to be better supported than that given by Dr. Howe based on the Third Edition. Accordingly, the
preponderance of the better supported medical evidence in this case favored the rating supplied
by Dr. Dall with respect to Mr. Albert's left foot injuries sustained in the June 16,1997 industrial
accident. Therefore the preponderance of the evidence in this case established that Mr. Albert's
industrial accident with Ameritemps on June 16,1997 caused him a 4% whole person
impairment due to his left foot injury.11
b.

10

Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability
Compensation Benefits Owed by Ameritemps, Inc. and/or
Hartford Ins. as a Result of Johnny Albert's June 16,1997
Industrial Accident

Bone fusion.

11

Ameritemps questioned Mr. Albert concerning a number of incidents where Mr. Albert
sustained trauma to his left great toe after the June 16,1997 industrial accident. However, no
medical evidence existed that demonstrated a causal connection between the subsequent
incidents referred to by Ameritemps and a significant, or ratable, impairment to Mr. Albert's left
foot other than that caused by his June 16,1997 industrial accident.
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With the exception of one day at Erickson Construction, Mr. Albert never worked again after the
June 16, 1997 industrial accident. Ameritemps claimed that it paid Mr. Albert $25,098.00 in
temporary total disability compensation from June 16,1997, to February of 1999. Mr. Albert did
not contradict the assertions of Ameritemps with respect to the payment of temporary total
disability compensation. Neither party addressed the payment of permanent partial disability
compensation with respect to Mr. Albert's June 16,1997 industrial accident. Because of the
resolution of the permanent total disability claim herein, I deferred further consideration of the
issues concerning temporary total disability compensation and permanent partial disability
compensation.
C.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation.
L

Permanent Total Disability.

As set forth in Section LF. supra, the respondents conceded that Mr. Albert was permanently and
totally disabled. However, each of the respondents denied that the respective industrial accident
associated with that particular respondent caused Mr. Albert's permanent total disability.
2.

The Cause of Johnny Albert's Permanent Total Disability.

Mr. Albert incurred a 2lA % whole person impairment as a result of the low back injury he
sustained on June 18,1990 while employed for Quality Plating, [see: Section IH.B.2. supra]. Mr.
Albert remained off work only one week following his June 18,1990 industrial injury then
returned to regular employment with Quality Plating, [see: Section HLB.2.a. supra].
Mr. Albert also incurred a 2V2 % whole person impairment as a result of the low back injury he
sustained on January 21,1991 while employed for Barnard & Burk. [see: Section m.B.3. supra].
Mr. Albert did not identify any lost time from work as a result of his January 21,1991 industrial
accident, [see: Section HI.B.3.b. supra].
Mr. Albert's industrial accident with American Asbestos on July 28,1991 resulted in a 9% whole
person impairment as a result of injuries to his right foot caused by the accident, [see: Section
III.B.4.a. supra]. Because of the injuries cause to Mr. Albert's right foot by his industrial accident
on July 28,1991, Dr. Jee stated:
He should be retrained for an occupation that will not involve prolonged walking
or standing. Furthermore, he cannot climb up ladders, or heights, due to risk of
falling. An ideal position would either involve a job at a work bench sitting or a

desk job. Exhibit "J-l" at 233].
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On November 30,1993 Dr. Howe described Mr. Albert's "Functional Work Capacity" as result
of his right foot injuries from the July 28,1991 industrial accident:
Preclusion from heavy lifting, climbing ladders, working at heights and from
frequent walking, squatting, kneeling and stair climbing, [id. at 212].
Nevertheless, after a lengthy convalescence Mr. Albert sallied forth again into the work force at
Ameritemps. Mr. Albert's industrial accident with Ameritemps on June 16,1997 resulted in a
4% whole person impairment as a result of injuries to his left foot caused by the accident, [see:
Section H[.B.5.a. supra]. Because of the injuries caused to Mr. Albert's left foot by his industrial
accident on June 16, 1997, Dr. Howe stated:
Johnny has worked a heavy labor type job. I told him in theory he could return to
a light duty job, basically a sit-down job. He cannot walk much except to and
from work, should not be doing any carrying, lifting, etc. [Exhibit "J-l" at 156].
Unfortunately, Mr. Albert also suffered from serious psychological problems that caused him
considerable difficulty in learning new tasks or performing jobs that required any mental acuity.
After Mr. Albert's industrial accident with American Asbestos on July 28,1991, Barry Richards
LCSW noted that:
At this time Johnny's primary (expressed) symptoms are indicative of a normal
post-traumatic stress response (survival honey moon), with no apparent major
PTSD symptoms, [id. at 251].
On November 30,1993 Dr. Richard Knoeble M.D. diagnosed Mr. Albert with "Severe
Depression." [id. at 212]. On March 30,1994 Ralf Gant PhD. completed a full scale
psychological assessment of Mr. Albert that revealed:
Johnny produced ... a full scale IQ Score of 83 placing him, by DSM ffl-R
Standards, in the borderline range of intellectual functioning.
*^ ^^ ^r *^ ^^ n* *l* *l* *|*

A review of the WAIS-R psychograph indicates severe deficits in long term
memory, general verbal knowledge, short term memory and attention, general use
of the language, arithmetic and concentration, impulse control and judgment and
abstract and logical thinking, [id, at 195],
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Dr. Gant diagnosed Mr. Albert with: "[rjeactive major depression tu juinniy & woiK-ieiaieu
injuries and his perceived losses." [id. at 198]. Dr. Gant further noted the causal connection
between Mr. Albert's industrial injuries and many of his psychological problems when he
observed that:
^ s a c o n s e q U e n c e of his reactive depression there is marked restriction in his
activities of daily living. He experiences marked difficulties in maintaining <=O.»;:J1
functioning. There are constant deficiencies of concentration. With his
unresolved physical conditions there is significant deficiency of persistence or
pace resulting in his inability to complete tasks in a timely manner, particularly in
a work setting. There has been a continual process of deterioration and
decompensation since his work injuries, leaving him to withdraw from work His
adaptive behavior since his injuries has been very poor. [id.].
Dr. Gant concluded with cautious optimism that:
[w]ith assistance from a rehabilitation program, Johnny could utilize his average
to high average residual skills. With appropriate intervention Johnny might yet be
restored to his role as a productive worker, [id.].
Mr. .Albert attended Vocational Rehabilitation and with all of his physical and psychological
problems did in fact return to work with Ameritemps until his final industrial accident on June 16,
1997. However, after Mr. Albert fractured his left great toe on June 16,1997, followed by four
consequent surgeries, Mr. Albert did not return to work.
On October 25, 2002 Leslie Coopei I M> p erformed another full sc aleps) etiological assessment
of Mr. Albert that disclosed:
Shiply Institute of Living Scale - Weschsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised Full
Scale IQ of 75 which falls at the 5th percentile and falls at the Borderline Mentally
Deficient range of intellectual functioning, [id. at 84],
The Beck Depression Inventory-II... His obtained raw score of 29 suggested
moderate depression, [id. at 85].
On October 22, 2002 Dr. Da\:•
psychological problems as:

.*. ^rehef^n

ugnu^

on:
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Axis I - (Clinical Psychiatric Disorders)
1. Depressive Disorder....
2. Learning Disorder, Reading.
3. Written Communication Disorder, Spelling.
4. Cognitive Disorder.... [id. at 41].
Axis II - (Personality Disorder or Disordered Personality Traits)
1. Personality Disorder, not otherwise specified, with Paranoid,
Borderline, and Antisocial Traits.
2. Borderline Intellectual Functioning
Axis V - (Global Assessment of Functioning)
The patient is not able to understand the complexities of his current
situation and is significantly out of touch with reality. He exhibits anger
impairment in work, family relations, judgment, and mood .... [id. at 42].
Dr. McCann proceeded to give Mr. Albert the only impairment rating for his psychological
problems, and apportioned the impairment:
According to the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment Fifth Edition, he has a Class 2 or mild impairment in
activities of daily functioning: Class 3 or moderate impairment in social
functioning: Class 3 or moderate impairment in concentration and Class 4 or
marked impairment in ability to adapt. Using traditional Utah concepts of
percentages, his overall estimated psychiatric impairment is Class 3 or probably in
this case about a 30% whole person impairment.
Of the patient's 30% impairment 10% is caused by his preexisting borderline
intellectual functioning, 10% is caused by his disordered personality traits and
lack of ability to conceptualize reality and about 10% is related to his injuries and
chronic pain.12 [id. at 43].

12

Dr. McCann did not further apportion the 10% psychological impairment caused by
Mr. Albert's industrial injuries between those respective injuries.
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In sum, Mr. Albert sustained a 5% whole person impairment from his back injuries caused half
and half respectively by the June 8, 1990 industrial accident at Quality, and the January 21,1991
industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. Mr. Albert incurred a 9% whole person impairment from
his right foot injuries caused by his July 28,1991 industrial accident at American Asbestos. Mr.
Albert sustained a 4% whole person impairment from his left foot injuries caused by his June 16,
1997 industrial accident with Ameritemps. Finally, Mr. Albert had a 30% whole person
impairment from psychological problems. Of Mr. Albert's psychological impairment, 20%
preexisted his industrial accidents, and 10% derived undifferentiated from his industrial injuries.
Mr. Albert's collective physical and psychological problems left him 48% impaired as to the
whole person.
Yet at the end of the day, the preponderance of the evidence in this case revealed that despite the
legion of medical and psychological impairments accumulated by Mr. Albert during the course
of his life, he remained able to work until the injury he sustained on June 16,1997 with
Ameritemps. The fractured great toe on June 16,1997, with the subsequent four surgeries and
4% whole person permanent impairment, proved to be the proverbial straw that broke the
camel's back. Mr. Albert never returned to work after the June 16,1997 industrial accident, and
thereafter by consensus remained permanently and totally disabled. Hence, the preponderance of
the evidence in this case established that Mr. Albert's industrial accident of June 16,1997 acted
as the direct cause of his permanent total disability.
3.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. as a Result of Johnny Albert's
June 16,1997 Industrial Accident

Mr. Albert's industrial accident of June 16,1997 directly caused his permanent total disability,
[see: Section ni.C.2.supra]. Mr. Albert never worked again after his industrial accident on June
16, 1997. The preponderance of the evidence in this case confirmed that Mr. Albert became
permanently and totally disabled on June 16,1997. Therefore, Ameritemps and Hartford owed
Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 per week from June 16,
1997, to June 17,2003. After June 17, 2003, Ameritemps and Hartford owed Mr. Albert on an
ongoing basis permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 less 50% of any
Social Security retirement benefits received by Mr. Albert during the same period. Ameritemps
and Hartford are additionally entitled to an offset for any amounts of temporary total, or
permanent partial, disability compensation paid to Mr. Albert for any time period that they also
owed Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A,

Employment and Compensation Rates.
1.

Transwest Construction,

Transwest employed Mr. Albert on November 4,1982. At the time of the November 4,1982
industrial accident at Transwest, Mr. Albert was not married and had no dependent children.
At the time of his industrial accident with Transwest on November 4,1982, Mr. Albert earned
$4.00 per hour, and worked 40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's
appropriate workers' compensation rate with Transwest equaled $107.00 per week. [$4.00/hour x
40 hours/week = $160.00/week x 2/3 = $107.00/week].
2.

Quality Plating.

Quality employed Mr. Albert on June 18,1990. At the time of the June 18,1990 industrial
accident at Quality, Mr. Albert was not married, but had one dependent child.
At the time of his industrial accident with Quality on June 18, 1990, Mr. Albert earned $5.50 per
hour, and worked 40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate
workers' compensation rate with Quality equaled $152.00 per week. [$5.50/hour x 40
hours/week = $220.00/week x 2/3 = $146.66/week + 5.00/week (dependent's allowance) =
$152.00/week (rounded to nearest whole dollar)].
3.

Barnard & Burk*

Barnard & Burk employed Mr. Albert on January 21,1991. At the time of the January 21,1991
industrial accident at Barnard & Burk, Mr. Albert was not married, but had one dependent child.
Mr. Albert earned an average weekly wage of $473.20 from Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Mr.
Albert's appropriate temporary total disability compensation rate equaled $320.00 per week.
[$473.20 x 2/3 = 315.46/week + $5.00/week (dependent's allowance) = $320.00 rounded to the
nearest whole dollar)]. The maximum permanent partial disability compensation rate as of
January 21,1991 equaled $243.00 per week. The maximum permanent total disability
compensation rate as of January 21,1991 equaled $309.00 per week.
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4.

American Asbestos Abatement

Mr. Albert's weekly wage rate with American Asbestos equaled $510.20 per week as of July 28,
1991, which yielded: (1) a temporary total disability compensation rate of $345.00 per week; (2)
a permanent partial disability compensation rate of $252.00 per week, and; (3) a permanent total
disability compensation rate of $252.00 per week.
5.

Ameritemps, Inc.

Ameritemps employed Mr. Albert on June 16,1997. At the time of the June 16,1997 industrial
accident at Ameritemps, Mr. Albert was not married, but had two dependent children.
Mr. Albert's weekly wage with Ameritemps at the time of his industrial accident on June 16,
1997 averaged $344.51. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate workers' compensation rate with
Ameritemps equaled $240.00 per week. [ $344.51/week x 2/3 = $229.67/week + 10.00/week
(dependents' allowance) = $240.00/week (rounded to nearest whole dollar)].
B.

The Respective Industrial Accidents and Consequent Injuries*
1.

The November 4,1982 Industrial Accident with Transwest
Construction Case No. 2002595.

On November 4,1982 Mr. Albert worked at Transwest building trusses. A stack of the trusses
fell over on his low back. Mr. Albert remained off of work with low back pain for one week
following the November 4,1982 industrial accident at Transwest. Between 1982, and 1990, Mr.
Albert sustained no further injuries to his low back.
a.

Injuries Caused by the November 4,1982 Industrial Accident
at Transwest Construction.

Mr. Albert suffered from chronic low back pain, which resulted in a 5% whole person
impairment While Mr. Albert suffered from chronic back pain that resulted in a 5% whole
person impairment, none of his rated low back problems derived from the remote November
1982 industrial accident at Transwest.
b.

Workers' Compensation Benefits Owed by Transwest
Construction and/or Uninsured Employers' Fund as a Result
of Johnny Albert's November 4,1982 Industrial Accident
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Mr. Albert's single "Application for Hearing" against Transwest and UEF as represented in Case
No. 2002595 claimed only permanent total disability compensation. Mr. Albert suffered no
permanent impairment from his November 4,1982 industrial accident with Transwest.
Consequently, Mr. Albert's November 4,1982 industrial accident could not have caused his
permanent total disability. Therefore, Mr. Albert's claim against Transwest and UEF for
permanent total disability compensation must be dismissed with prejudice.
2.

The June 18,1990 Industrial Accident with Quality Plating Case No.
20011070.
a.

Injuries Caused by the June 18,1990 Industrial Accident at
Quality Plating.

On June 18,1990 Mr. Albert picked up a stack of metal plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds, and
put them on a table. While he lifted the plates Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Mr. Albert
remained off work for one week and treated with a chiropractor for his low back problems
sustained in the June 18,1990 industrial accident.
b.

The Issue of Legal Causation as Applied to Johnny Albert's
June 18,1990 Industrial Accident

The Utah Supreme Court held that:
The language "arising out of or in the course of his employment"... was apparently
intended to ensure that compensation is only awarded where there is sufficient
causal connection between the disability and the working conditions. The
causation requirement makes it necessary to distinguish those injuries which (a)
coincidentally occur at work because a preexisting condition results in symptoms
which appear during work hours without any enhancement from the workplace,
and (b) those injuries which occur because some condition or exertion required by
the employment increases the risk of injury which the worker normally faces in
his everyday life. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15, 24-25
(Utah 1986).
The Court in Allen then adopted an analysis that involved a two part causation test to establish
both legal causation and medical causation. Id. at 25. With respect to legal causation the Court in
Allen held that:
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To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a preexisting condition
must show that the employment contributed something substantial to increase the
risk he already faced in everyday life because of his condition. This additional
element of risk in the workplace is usually supplied by an exertion greater than
that undertaken in normal everyday life. This extra exertion serves to offset the
preexisting condition of the employee as a likely cause of the injury, thereby
eliminating claims for impairments resulting from a personal risk rather than
exertions at work.
Thus, where the claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which contributes
to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal
causation. Where there is no preexisting condition, a usual or ordinary exertion is
sufficient. Id. at 25-26.
On June 18,1990 Mr. Albert lifted a stack of steel plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds and put
them on a table. Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Quality argued that Mr. Albert could not
establish legal causation between his industrial accident on June 18,1990, and the low back
problems he complained of thereafter. However, Quality failed to establish that Mr. Albert
suffered from preexisting low back problems of the nature and kind he sustained on June 18,
1990. Therefore, Mr. Albert had no need to jump the higher legal causation hurdle enunciated by
the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d at 24-25.
c.

Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident

Mr. Albert remained off work from Quality six days from June 19,1990, to June 25,1990, when
Dr. Conger released him back to work. Consequently, Qaulity and/or WCF owed Mr. Albert
$65.36 in temporary total disability compensation for the six days, minus three, he missed work
due to the June 18,1990 industrial accident at Quality. [$152.00/week x $.43 weeks (three days)
- $65.36].
d.

Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident.

The June 18,1990 industrial accident at Quality caused half of Mr. Albert's 5% whole person
impairment due to chronic low back pain. Therefore, Quality and/or WCF owed Mr. Albert
$1,185.60 in permanent partial disability compensation consequent to the June 18,1990
industrial accident. [$152.00/week x 312 weeks x 0.025 = $1,185.60].
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e.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident

The injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the June 18,1990 did not constitute the direct cause of
his permanent total disability. Therefore, Quality and WCF did not owe Mr. Albert permanent
total disability compensation.
3.

The January 21,1991 Industrial Accident with Barnard & Burk
Group, Inc. Case No. 20011071.
a.

Injuries Caused by the January 21,1991 Industrial Accident at
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc.

On January 21,1991 Mr. Albert worked for Barnard & Burk removing asbestos at the Chevron
Refinery. Mr. Albert slipped, fell, and landed on a pipe with his low back.
b.

Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins.
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial
Accident.

Mr. Albert did not identify any periods of time he missed work due to the January 21,2001
industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Barnard & Burk owed Mr. Albert no
temporary total disability as a result of the January 21,1991 industrial accident.
c.

Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins.
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial
Accident

The January 21,1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk caused half of Mr. Albert's 5%
whole person impairment due to chronic low back pain. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and
National Union owed Mr. Albert $1,895.40 in permanent partial disability compensation
consequent to the January 21,2001 industrial accident. [$243.00/week x 312 weeks x 0.025 =
$1,895.40].
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cL

Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins.
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial
Accident

The injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the January 21,2001 industrial accident did not
constitute the direct cause of his permanent total disability. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and
National Union did not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation.
4.

The July 28,1991 Industrial Accident with American Asbestos
Abatement Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072.

On July 28,1991 Mr. Albert worked for American Asbestos at Hill Air Force Base. Mr. Albert
fell more than twenty feet from a scaffold and landed primarily on his right foot. Mr. Albert
suffered a: "right comminuted calcaneus fracture." Mr. Albert underwent three surgeries on his
right foot consequent to his July 28,1991 industrial accident. Mr. Albert's right foot injury
caused by his industrial accident of July 28,1991 resulted in a 9% whole person impairment.
b.

Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability
Compensation Benefits Owed by American Asbestos
Abatement and/or Workers Compensation Fund as a Result of
Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial Accident

The 1994 Order resolved the issues concerning temporary total and permanent partial disability
compensation owed by American Asbestos and WCF to Mr. Albert as a result of the July 28,
1991 industrial accident. Mr. Albert did not identify any additional periods of temporary total
disability, nor any additional permanent partial impairment, resultant from the July 28,1991
industrial accident. Accordingly, American Asbestos and WCF owed Mr. Albert no additional
temporary total, nor permanent partial, disability compensation for the July 21,1991 industrial
accident beyond that set forth in the 1994 Order.
c.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
American Asbestos Abatement and/or Workers Compensation
Fund as a Result of Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial
Accident

The injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the July 28,2001 industrial accident did not constitute
the direct cause of his permanent total disability. Therefore, American Asbestos and WCF did
not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation.

00521

Albert v. American Asbestos Abatement et al
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
page 28
5.

The June 16,1997 Industrial Accident with Ameritemps, Inc. Case
Nos. 991213 and 20011073.
a.

Injuries Caused by the June 16,1997 Industrial Accident at
Ameritemps, Inc.

On June 16,1997 Mr. Albert worked for Ameritemps at Cisco Foods driving a self-propelled
pallet jack. Mr. Albert crushed his left great toe between the pallet jack and a steel "I" beam.
Mr. Albert suffered an angulatedfractureof thefirstproximal phalanx as a result of the June 16,
1997 industrial accident. Mr. Albert underwent four surgeries with respect to the left great toe
fracture sustained in June 16,1997 industrial accident. Mr. Albert's industrial accident with
Ameritemps on June 16,1997 caused him a 4% whole person impairment due to his left foot
injury.
b.

Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability
Compensation Benefits Owed by Ameritemps, Inc. and/or
Hartford Ins, as a Result of Johnny Albert's June 16,1997
Industrial Accident

Because of the resolution of the permanent total disability claim herein, I deferred further
consideration of the issues concerning temporary total disability compensation and permanent
partial disability compensation.
C.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation.
1.

Permanent Total Disability.

Mr. Albert is permanently and totally disabled.
2.

The Cause of Johnny Albert's Permanent Total Disability.

Mr. Albert sustained a 2Vi % whole person impairment as a result of a low back injury he
sustained on June 18,1990 while employed for Quality Plating. Mr. Albert remained off work
only one week following his June 18,1990 industrial injury then returned to regular employment
with Quality Plating.
Mr. Albert also sustained a 2Vi % whole person impairment as a result of a low back injury he
sustained on January 21,1991 while employed for Barnard & Burk. Mr. Albert did not identify
any lost time at work as a result of his January 21,1991 industrial accident.

00522

Albert v. American Asbestos Abatement et al
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
page 29

Mr. Albert's industrial accident with American Asbestos on July 28,1991 resulted in a 9% whole
person impairment as a result of injuries to his right foot caused by the accident. Mr. Albert also
suffered from serious psychological problems that caused him considerable difficulty in learning
new tasks or performing jobs that required any mental acuity. Mr. Albert's psychological
problems left him with 30% whole person impairment. Of Mr. Albert's psychological
impairment, 20% preexisted his industrial accidents, and 10% derived undifferentiated from his
industrial injuries. Mr. Albert's collective physical and psychological problems left him 48%
impaired as to the whole person.
Mr. Albert with all of his physical and psychological problems did in fact return to work with
Ameritemps until his final industrial accident on Junel6,1997. However, after Mr. Albert
fractured his left great toe on June 16,1997 followed by four consequent surgeries, Mr. Albert
did not return to work. Mr. Albert's industrial accident with Ameritemps on June 16,1997
resulted in a 4% whole person impairment as a result of injuries to his left foot caused by the
accident.

The Utah Supreme Court specifically held that in permanent total disability cases it is the duty of
the Labor Commission to determine the ultimate issue of disabiUty. Hardman v. Salt Lake City
Fleet Management, 725 P. 2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1986). Professor Larson stated that:
Apart from apportionment statutes, the employer is generally held liable for the
entire disability resulting from a combination of the prior disability and the
present injury. ARTHUR LARSON and LEX LARSON, LARSONS WORKERS* COMPENSATION
LAW § 90.01 (2002).
Neither applicable Utah Code Amend § 35-1-67 (1995), nor its successors, nor its predecessors
that deal with permanent total disabiUty, contain any provisions for apportionment of liability.
Utah Code Amend § 35-l-67(l)(b) (1995) provides in relevant part that:
To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee
has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(ii) the industrial accident... was the direct cause of the employee's
permanent total disability.
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The Utah Court of Appeals held that:
Under the 'odd lot' doctrine, the Commission may find permanent total disability
when a relatively small percentage of impairment caused by an industrial accident
is combined with other factors to render the claimant unable to obtain suitable
employment. Hoskins v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 918 P. 2d 150,154 (Utah
App. 1996) (citing: Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 P. 2d
1323,1326 (Utah 1986).
The case of Smith v. Mity Lite presented facts similar to the present case. Smith v. Mity Lite, 939
P. 2d 684 (Utah App. 1997). In Smith the claimant suffered from nonindustrial depression,
somatoform pain disorder, opiate dependency, personality disorder and depression, id. at 689.
The Utah Court of Appeals held that the Labor Commission ought to have found permanent total
disability where the claimant proved by a preponderance of the evidence the: "[industrial
accident caused a portion of Smith's physical impairment; that he cannot perform his former job;
that he is currently disabled." id. at 690.
In the present case, despite the legion of medical and psychological impairments accumulated by
Mr. Albert during the course of his life, he remained able to work until the injury he sustained on
June 16,1997 with Ameritemps. The fractured great toe on June 16,1997, with the subsequent
four surgeries and 4% whole person permanent impairment, proved to be the proverbial straw
that broke the camel's back. Mr. Albert never returned to work after the June 16,1997 industrial
accident, and thereafter remained permanently and totally disabled. Hence, Mr. Albert's
industrial accident of June 16,1997directly caused his permanent total disability.13

3,

Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. as a Result of Johnny Albert's
June 16,1997 Industrial Accident

13

Some of the respondents argued that Social Security Administration's determination of
Mr. Albert's permanent total disability based on his psychological impairments should be
determinative concerning the cause of his permanent total disability for workers' compensation
benefits. Of course Social Security's determinations are not binding on the Labor Commission.
Otherwise, the Labor Commission in every like case would simply await and adopt the decision
of the Social Security Administration as to permanent total disability and the cause thereof.
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Mr. Albert's industrial accident of June 16, 1997 directly caused his permanent total disability.
Mr. Albert never worked again after his industrial accident on June 16,1997. Mr. Albert became
permanently and totally disabled on June 16,1997. Therefore, Ameritemps and Hartford owed
Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 per week from June 16,
1997, to June 17, 2003. After June 17,2003 Ameritemps and Hartford owed Mr. Albert
permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 less 50% of any Social Security
retirement benefits received by Mr. Albert during the same period. Ameritemps and Hartford are
entitled to an offset for any amounts of temporary total, or permanent partial, disability
compensation paid to Mr. Albert for any time period that they also owed Mr. Albert permanent
total disability compensation.
V. ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that all of Johnny Albert's claims against the respondent,
Transwest Construction, in Claim No. 2002595 are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of Johnny Albert's claims against the respondents
Uninsured Employer's Fund and Employers' Reinsurance Fund in Case Nos. 97576,
991213,991214,20011070,20011071,20011072,20011073, and 2002595 are hereby
dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in Case No. 20011070, Quality Plating and/or Workers5
Compensation Fund of Utah shall pay Johnny Albert temporary total disability
compensation from June 18,1990, to June 25,1990, at the rate of $152.00 per week for 0.43
weeks, for a total of $65.36. That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in Case No. 20011070, Quality Plating and/or Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah shall pay Johnny Albert permanent partial disability
compensation for a two and one half percent (2Vi %) impairment rating at the rate of $152.00
per week for a total of $1,185.60. That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Albert's claims for permanent total disability
compensation against Quality Plating and Workers' Compensation Fund in Case No.
20011070 are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Quality Plating and/or Workers Compensation Fund
shall with respect to Case No. 20011070 pay all medical expenses reasonably related to Johnny
Albert's industrial accident of June 18,1990, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Alberts claim against Barnard & Burk and/or
National Union Fire Ins. for temporary total disability compensation in Case No. 20011071
is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in Case No. 20011071 respondents, Barnard & Burk
and/or National Union Fire Ins., shall pay Johnny Albert permanent partial disability
compensation for a two and one half percent (2Vi %) impairment rating at the rate of $243.00
per week for a total of $1,895.40. That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Albert's claims against Barnard & Burk and
National Union Fire Ins. in Case No* 20011071 for permanent total disability compensation
are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, Barnard & Burk and/or National Union
Fire Ins., shall with respect to Case No. 20011071 pay all medical expenses reasonably related
to Johnny Albert's industrial accident of January 21,1991, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per
annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Albert's claims against American Asbestos
Abatement and/or Workers Compensation Fund in Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072
for additional temporary total disability compensation, permanent partial disability
compensation, and permanent total disability compensation are hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, American Asbestos Abatement and/or
Workers Compensation Fund shall with respect to Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072
pay all medical expenses reasonably related to Johnny Albert's industrial accident of July 28,
1991, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins, in Case Nos.
991213 and 20011073 shall pay Johnny Albert permanent total disability compensation at the
rate of $240.00 per week from the date of permanent total disability on June 16,1997, until June
16,2003 in the total amount of $74,880.00, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum for
each payment as it came due, less any compensation already paid by respondents Ameritemps,
Inc. or Hartford Ins. After June 16,2003, respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins.,
shall continue to pay Johnny Albert permanent total disability compensation at the rate of
$240.00 per week less fifty percent (50%) of any Social Security retirement benefits received by
Johnny Albert for the same period.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins., shall
with respect to Case Nos. 991213 and 20011073 pay all medical expenses reasonably related to
Johnny Albert's industrial accident of June 16,1997, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per
annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins., shall
pay statutory attorneys' fees of $10,352.00 directly to Richard Burke. That amount shall be
deducted from Johnny Albert's award and sent directly to Richard Burke's office.
Dated this 22nd day of July 2003,

ard M. La Jeunesse
strative Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion For Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner.
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